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THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF TRADE BETWEEN
PLANNED AND MARKET ECONOMIES: THE
SOVIET-AMERICAN EXAMPLE*
HAROiio J. BERMANf
INTRODUCTION
State trading differs in kind, and not only in degree, from other forms of govern-
mental control of international trade. By tariffs, quotas, prohibitions, exchange
restrictions, subsidies, credits, and the like, a government may limit or encourage the
conduct of trade by private businessmen; nevertheless, despite such controls, the dis-
tinction between the world of commerce, built on market principles, and the world
of politics, built on other principles, remains a real one. When state organizations
themselves conduct trade, however, the distinction becomes blurred and in some cases
loses its reality entirely.
This fact becomes apparent when one considers the most extreme form of state-
trading system, that of integrally planned economies of the Soviet type, all of whose
foreign trade (including not only export and import, but shipping, banking, in-
surance, and the like) is conducted by state organizations. Indeed, the phrase "state
trading," which implies the co-existence of private trading, does not fully express
the union of economics and politics in Soviet foreign trade, or, for that matter, in
Soviet domestic trade. The Soviet type of foreign trade system thus reveals the
inadequacy of conventional concepts and traditional institutions which were devised
to deal with the situation in which the state organizations of a country appear along-
side its private firms and hence can be assimilated, in our thinking, to such firms.
If the foreign trade systems of planned economies compel us to think about state-
trading organizations in different terms, where are such terms to be found? They
can only be discovered through analysis of the actual workings of the foreign trade
* The present article is adapted from the writer's General Report to the UNESCO Conference on
Legal .Aspects of Trade Between Planned and Free Economies, Rome, February 1958. Assistance in
research by Ralph Nader, LL.B. 1958, Harvard University, and A. Joshua Sherman, LL.B. 1957, Harvard
University, under grants of the Committee on Research and Development of Harvard University, is grate-
fully acknowledged. A condensed version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the
American Society of International Law, Washington, D.C., May 1, 1959, and will be printed in a forth-
coming volume of that Society's PROCaEDNmos.
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systems of planned economies and of the alternative methods of dealing with them
which have been developed by private traders and governments of market economies.
For purposes of such analysis, it may be useful to undertake a case study of trade
relations between the Soviet Union, which is an extreme type of planned ecounomy,
and the United States, whose foreign trade is, in general, less strictly controlled by
governmental authorities than that of any major country in the world. Despite the
special political and economic aspects of the case selected-and, in part, just because
of those special aspects-such a study may shed light on the problems of developing
an adequate framework for trade relations between planned economies and countries
whose foreign and domestic trade is conducted primarily by private businessmen,
operating largely on the basis of market conditions. Indeed, the example of Soviet-
American trade illuminates the problems of state trading in general by bringing to>
the foreground questions of political and economic philosophy which are present,.
though not always so apparent, whenever any state conducts international trade.
THE SovraT SYsTEM oF FoREIGi TRADE1
Three principal characteristics distinguish the Soviet system of foreign trade frod-t
other trading systems.2 The first is that Soviet foreign trade is operated and admin-
istered exclusively by state agencies. The second is that Soviet foreign trade is con-
ducted on the basis of integrated national economic planning. The third is that
Soviet foreign trade and Soviet national economic planning are under the direction of
a government which is led by a Communist Party. Although these three character-
istics are closely interrelated, each of them gives rise to a distinct set of problems.
A. Problems Arising from the Operation and Administration
of Soviet Foreign Trade Exclusively by State Agencies
The operation and administration of Soviet foreign trade is designated by the Soviet
'Scholarly literature in English on the Soviet system of foreign trade is very skimpy. ALEXANDER
BAYXOV, SOVIET FOREIGxN TRADE (1946), and MIKHAIL V. CONDOIOE, RUSSIAN-AMERICAN TRADE (1947)
are sketchy and out of date. General books on the Soviet economy usually subordinate the treatment
of the institutional aspects of Soviet foreign trade. However, HARRY SCHWARTZ, RussIA's SOVIET ECON-
OMY c. 14 (ad ed. 1954), contains valuable information. Also MICHAEL L. HOFFMAN, PROBLEMS OF
EAsr-Wrr TRADE (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, International Conciliation No. 511,
X957), and RAYMOND F. MIREsELL & J. N. BEHRmAN, FINANCING FREE WORLD TRADE WITH THE SINO-
SOVIET BLOC (958), are useful, though brief. A valuable compendium of the legal aspects of Soviet
foreign trade is a mimeographed German monograph, CARL-HANS Bi5TOW, DAS GEGENWXRTIGE INNER-
STAATLICH GEREGELTE AusSENHANDELSRECIT DER UDSSR UNTER BERiUCxSICHTIGUNG DER ZWISCHEN-
STAATLICHEN VERTRXGE (1956).
' The term Soviet system of foreign trade is used to refer to the system of the Soviet Union. Because.
of the special kind of communist system established in Yugoslavia, and also because of certain differences-
in the organization of foreign trade among the other communist countries, it is not possible to dis-
tinguish merely between communist and noncommunist trading systems. To speak of "Eastern" and
"Western" systems is even more misleading. The term "communist" poses certain difficulties, because
of the doctrine that the Soviet Union is now in the stage of "socialism," and is only gradually moving
toward the establishment of full "communism." To speak of the Soviet system as a socialist system,
however, is confusing to those who identify socialism with the type of political and economic organiza-
tion which exists, for example, in Sweden. The term "communist" is used throughout this article to refer
to countries in which the government is led by a Communist Party.
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Constitution, by Soviet decrees, and by Soviet writers as a "state monopoly. '3 In this
respect, foreign trade does not differ from most of the other branches of the Soviet
economy.4 However, the Soviet state cannot control the terms and conditions of
foreign trade to the same extent that it can control the terms and conditions of its
domestic economic activities. If it is successfully to maintain extensive economic
connections with foreign countries, it must adapt its methods of trade to foreign
requirements
Of the many particular problems of adjustment which have arisen, a few may be
singled out as particularly significant from the point of view of the development of
' Cf. U.S.S.R. CoNsT. art. 14: "The following shall be within the competence of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics in the form of its highest organs of state authority and its organs of state admin-
istration: . . . h) foreign trade on the basis of state monopoly." A 1922 decree states: "The foreign
trade of the RSFSR shall be a state monopoly. The state foreign trade monopoly shall be realized by
the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade." SBORNIK UZAKONENI [COLLECTION or LAws] 10. 24, art.
266 (1922). The R.S.F.S.R. is the largest of the constituent republics of the Soviet Union; in 1922, the
Soviet Union had not yet been constituted as such. The People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade
of the Soviet Union was established in 1924. The People's Commissariats were renamed Ministries in
1946.
The essence of the state monopoly of foreign trade, according to a resolution of the Plenum of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party, of October 5, 1925, "consists in the fact that the state itself
realizes the conduct of foreign trade through a specially created organ (the People's Commissariat of
Foreign Trade)." The state "establishes what organizations, in what spheres and in what amounts, can
carry on immediate operations in foreign trade; proceeding from the tasks of advancing the economy
and socialist construction, it defines, by means of the export-import plan, what goods and in what
quantities may be taken out of the country and what can be brought into it; by means of a system of
licenses and contingents it immediately regulates import and export and the operations of the foreign
trade organizations." s DIREKTIVY KPSS x SOVETSKOGO PRAVITEL's'rvO PO KOZIAsTvENNYM VOPRoSAM
1917-28 [DIRECTIVEs oF TE CPSU AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON ECONOMIC QusIoNs, 1917-28], at
555 (1958).
"Thus the state monopoly of foreign trade," writes a recent author, after quoting the above statements,
"should be defined as the concentration in the hands of the state, as represented by organs of state admin-
istration specially authorized therefor, of the entire matter of the conduct of foreign trade." Pozdniakov,
Prapovye Voprosy Gosudarstvennoi Monopolii Vneshnei Torgovli v SSSR [Legal Questions of the Stale
Monopoly of Foreign Trade in the U.S.S.R.], in D.,M. GENKIN (ED.), PAvOVYE VoPRos" VNEsHNEI
ToRGovLi SSSR s EvRoruSximis STRANAMI NARODNOI DEmoKRATsll [LEGAL QursIoNs oF FOREIGN TRADE
OF THEa U.S.S.R. wrTH EUROPEAN COUNTRIES OF PEOPLE's DE ocRAcY] 5, 9 (1955).
It should be noted that in the 1920's, the phrase "state monopoly" did not signify that all foreign
trade was to be conducted by "organs of state administration." Under the 1922 decree and the 19a5
Party definition quoted above, the state could authorize private and cooperative organizations to conduct
foreign trade. In fact, a good deal of Soviet foreign trade at that time was conducted by the Central
Union of Cooperatives (Tsentrosoiuz). The R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code, which was enacted in 1922, and
which is still in force, states: "All persons, juridical and physical, residing in the RSFSR shall participate
in foreign trade only through the medium of the state as represented by the People's Commissariat of
Foreign Trade. Independent appearances on foreign markets shall not be permitted except in instances
specially indicated by law and only under the supervision of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade."
R.S.F.S.R. CIVIL CoDE art. 17 (1956) (U.S.S.R.). A recent article indicates that since 1957, Tsentrosoiuz
has once again been active in Soviet foreign trade. See Kaplun, Mezhdunarodnye Torgovye Sviazi
Tsentrosoiuza [International Trade Links of Tsentrosoinz], Vneshiaia Torgovlia, No. 3, 1959, P. 0.
'This was not true of the period of the 1920'% under the so-called New Economic Policy, when a
considerable amount of private domestic trade and a certain amount of private production was permitted.
The distinctive term "state monopoly," which is used only to describe the foreign trade system, is, therefore,
largely of historical significance. It remains true, however, that foreign trade is more highly centralized
than many other branches of the Soviet economy. Cf. infra note 127.
a The Soviet Union traded in 1957 with 53 countries. Its total volume of exports and imports was over
$8,ooo,ooo,ooo, of which over $2,ooo,oooooo was with noncommunist countries. MwisrERsrvo VNESIINEI
ToRGowv.s SSSR [MiNIsTrY OF FOREIGN TRADE OF THE U.S.S.R.], VNESHNIAIA TOROOVLIA SOUZA SSR ZA
1957 GoD--STATIsrICHsKxIi OBzoR [FOREIGN TRtADE OF THE U.S.S.R. FOR 1957-STATTICAL SUtRVEY]
7-10 (958).
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an adequate legal framework for trade between communist and noncommunist
countries. One is the problem of sovereign immunity. It is in the interest of the
Soviet state to take advantage of the doctrine of sovereign immunity as developed
in other countries. On the other hand, it is also in the interest of the Soviet state not
to deter foreign firms from trading with the Soviet Union through fear that the
defense of sovereign immunity will be used to defeat any claims which may arise.
A second problem arises because certain legal concepts and institutions developed
for Soviet domestic trade conflict with legal concepts and institutions generally
accepted in the non-Soviet world. It is in the interest of the Soviet state that its
commercial arrangements with foreign firms conform to its own law. On the
other hand, the Soviet state cannot expect foreign firms easily to accept Soviet law
where it differs sharply from the common commercial standards of the international
business community.
A third problem relates to procedures for settlement of disputes. It is in the
interest of the Soviet state to avoid litigation in foreign courts or foreign arbitral
tribunals by the inclusion in foreign trade contracts of a clause referring disputes
to arbitration in Moscow. But a non-Soviet trader asked to sign such a clause will
question whether the Soviet arbitration tribunal is itself not part of the state mo-
nopoly of foreign trade and hence inherently partial to the Soviet cause.
In the course of four decades of experience in international trade, the Soviet state
has made serious efforts to resolve these and other similar problems in a manner
acceptable both to it and to its trading partners. To say that these efforts have been
to a considerable extent successful is not to deny the need for further adaptations
and adjustments on the Soviet side. At the same time, the Soviet system of foreign
trade, as it has actually developed, compels a revaluation of some of the oversimplified
concepts of state trading which have existed in the non-Soviet world.
The Soviet leadership understood from the outset that the state monopoly of
foreign trade does not require that foreign trade be conducted by the state itself in
its own name. The state may realize its monopoly by authorizing or establishing
various agencies to carry on foreign trade in their own names, under state super-
vision. By allocating a relatively small degree of independence to these agencies,
the Soviet state has been able to achieve a relatively high degree of flexibility in
adapting its trading methods to the international commercial and legal order within
which it must live.
To understand the extent to which Soviet state trading agencies are independent
or dependent and to evaluate the degree of flexibility and of rigidity in their adapta-
tions to international conditions, it is necessary to analyze in some detail the organiza-
tional structure of Soviet foreign trade as a whole.
The administration and operation of Soviet foreign trade is in the hands, chiefly,
of three agencies: the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union and its trade
delegations (torgpredstua6), a number of foreign trade "combines" (ob"edineniia7),
" An abbreviation for torgovye predstavitel'stva; the singular is torgovoe predstavitel'stvo, or in abbrevi-
ation, torgpredstvo.
" The singular is ob"edinenoe. A more literal translation would be "union." A special term is needed
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.and the All-Union Chamber of Commerce.
i. Ministry of Foreign Trade
As part of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union,' the Ministry of Foreign
Trade plans Soviet foreign trade within the limits of over-all national economic
plans, drafts trade agreements with foreign states, works out and administers tariff
policies, issues licenses for export and import of goods, and directs the work of its
trade delegations and of the foreign trade combines.'
A superficial reading of the list of powers and functions of the Ministry of For-
eign Trade might leave the impression that they are not essentially different from
the powers and functions of corresponding ministries of West European countries.
The basic differences become apparent, however, when attention is given to the
fact that the trade delegations and the foreign trade combines whose activities the
Ministry plans and directs are state agencies subordinate administratively to the
Ministry itself.
The trade delegations appear on foreign markets as representatives of the Soviet
state as such. They are a component part of the diplomatic corps of the Soviet
Union abroad; at the same time, they have virtually unrestricted power to conclude
trade contracts with foreign firms in the name of the Soviet state.1° Soviet writers
have characterized them as "a new type of agency appropriate only to a socialist
state and created for the realization abroad of the monopoly of foreign trade."'"
The Soviet trade delegate-i.e., the chief of the trade delegation-is almost in-
variably, if not invariably, an official of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and the
other members of the trade delegation are often officials either of the Ministry or of
foreign trade combines or of domestic state industrial organizations.
The Soviet trade delegation is not a legal entity under Soviet law; it is not
responsible for its debts and cannot sue or be sued. In the absence of treaty provision
to the contrary, the trade delegation may, and generally does, invoke the doctrine of
sovereign immunity to avoid the jurisdiction of foreign courts.' 2 The United States
has expressly excluded Soviet trade delegations from entry, on the ground of their
sovereign immunity.' 3
to distinguish the type of organization used to carry on foreign trade from other types of operative state
organizations used in Soviet domestic industry and trade, which are called predpriiatila (literally, "enter-prises").
8 The Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union is "the highest executive and administrative organ of
state authority of the U.S.S.R." U.S.S.R. CoNST. art. 64. It is charged, inter alia, with "taking steps
for realizing the national economic plan and the state budget and for strengthening the system of money
and credit." Id. art. 68. The Council of Ministers is, technically, the Government of the Soviet Union.
9 Cf. A. M. SMIRNov & N. N. LiuIM0V (EDs.), VNESHNIAIA TORGOVLIA SSSR [FoRzo TRaDE OF THE
U.S.S.R.] 77 (1954), where a somewhat more elaborate list of powers and functions is given.
"°Cf. Statute on Trade Delegations and Trade Agencies of the USSR Abroad, SOBRANIE Z~Aotov
SSSR [CoLL-EcToN OF LAws OF THE U.S.S.R.] no. 59, art. 354 (1933).
11 SMIRNov & LitIDMov (EDs.), op. ctit. supra note 9, at 78.
12 Cf. Fensterwald, Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading, 63 HARv. L. Rzv. 614, 634-39
(195o). Provisions limiting the immunity of Soviet trade delegations may be found in commercial
treaties between the Soviet Union and other communist countries. Pozdniakov, supra note 3, at 29-31.
Cf. 1934 Anglo-Soviet Treaty. Fensterwald, supra at 635.
"
3 See infra 518.
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2. Foreign trade combines
A Soviet foreign trade combine, on the other hand, is a juridical person. It
may acquire rights in property in its own name, incur obligations, and sue and be
sued;14 it is responsible for its debts out of those assets which are within its power
of free disposition. ' It receives a charter which enumerates its powers and declares
the amount of its chartered capital."' The Soviet state-i.e., the treasury or fisc-
x, Cf. R.S.F.S.R. CIVIL CODE art. 13 (1956) (U.S.S.R.): "Juridical persons are such combines of
persons and such institutions or organizations as may, in their own name, acquire rights in property, incur
obligations, and sue and be sued in courts."
" The limitation of the liability of foreign trade combines to property within their power of free dis-
position is said to be based on general Soviet law as well as on Soviet trade treaties and agreements with
foreign countries. The general law cited is R.S.F.S.R. CIVIL CODE art. 19 (1956) (U.S.S.R.). The Soviet-
Danish treaty of August 17, 1946, is also quoted as follows: "Liability for any trade transactions, con-
cluded without the guarantee of the Trade Delegation by any state economic organizations of the USSR
which under Soviet legislation exercise the rights of independent juridical persons shall be borne by the
aforementioned organizations only, and execution under these transactions may be taken only against their
property." Other Soviet treaties have similar provisions. Cf. Genkin, Pravovoe Polozhenie Vsesoiuznykh
Vneshne-Torgovykh Ob"edinenii, [The Legal Status of All-Union Foreign Trade Combines], in GENKcIN
(ED.), op. cit. supra note 3, at 53, 71. Genkin adds: "Concerning the property of foreign trade com-
bines upon which creditors of the combine may levy compulsory execution, the charters of the combine
rely on general legislation concerning the property liability of state organizations." Ibid. Cf. charter of
Sudoimport art. 3, infra note 16. This legislation excludes certain types of property from execution
(land, buildings, machinery, and, in general, fixed capital), and in general permits execution on working
(turnover) capital (money, claims, accounts receivable, raw materials, fuel, finished goods, etc.). Cf.
G. KALIUZHNAIA, PRAVOVYF FOuMY MONOPOL11 VNEsHNEi ToRoOVLI SSSR I Irm IsTORicHESxom RAzvITI
[LEGAL FoRMs OF THE MONOPOLY OF FOREIGN TRADE OF THE U.S.S.R. IN THEIR HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT]
133 (951).
"
0 A typical charter of a foreign trade combine is the following charter of Sudoimport, which may be
found (in Russian) in the monthly journal of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Vneshniaia Torgovlia, No.
8, '954, P. 4o:
CHARTER OF THE ALL-UNION EXPORT-IMPORT COMBINE "SUDOIMPORT"
General Regulations
I. The All-Union Export-Import Combine "Sudoimport" is instituted for the carrying out of opera-
tions in the import, export and repair of ships abroad.
2. The All-Union Combine "Sudoimport" is an independent economic organization, possessing the
rights of a juridical person, which acts on principles of economic accountability.
3. The All-Union Combine "Sudoimport" is liable, in its operations and obligations, with that part
of its own property upon which, in conformity with current legislation in the U.S.S.R., execution may
be levied.
The State does not bear responsibility for the operations and obligations of the All-Union Combine
"Sudoimport."
The All-Union Combine "Sudoimport" does not bear responsibility for claims against the State, its
organs, or other organizations.
4. The All-Union Combine "Sudoimport" resides in Moscow.
5. The All-Union Combine "Sudoimport" has a round seal, with its name and mark in the center
of a hexahedron of two letters "SI," one inside the other.
r. The All-Union Combine "Sudoimport":
Functions
a) carries on operations for the export from the U.S.S.R. and sale in foreign markets of ships;
b) carries on operations for the import of ships into the U.S.S.R.;
c) carries on operations for the repair and re-equipment of ships abroad;
d) participates in the elaboration and carrying out of measures for the improvement of import
and export operations in goods within its nomenclature;
c) participates in the elaboration, within the prescribed order, of standards and technical condi-
tions for the goods within its nomenclature;
f) studies foreign markets, as well as achievements in production and trade techniques of goods
which relate to the nomenclature of the Combine.
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is not liable for the obligations of the combine, and it is not liable for the obligations
of the Soviet state or of any state organization other than itself.
Each of the Soviet foreign trade combines possesses a monopoly of foreign trade
transactions in a particular sphere of the economy. Thus, for example, all Soviet
exports and imports of lumber and and lumber products, such as cellulose and paper,
are transacted by the All-Union Export-Import Organization (Eksportles). Similarly,
all exports and imports of oil and oil products are carried out by Soiuznefteksport.
A list of the twenty-eight combines now in existence and a partial list of the com-
modities and activities over which they have jurisdiction is given in the accompanying
Pdghts of the Combine
7- For the realization of the functions enumerated in paragraph 6 of the present charter, the All-Union
Combine "Sudoimport" is given the right, in accordance with the corresponding laws, to:
a) perform all kinds of transactions, contracts, and other juridical acts, credit, commercial paper
and banking transactions with institutions, enterprises, societies, associations and individual persons,
both in the U.S.S.R. and abroad, sue and be sued, in courts and arbitral tribunals;
b) construct, establish, and let or take on lease enterprises subsidiary to its activities both in the
U.S.S.R. and abroad;
c) institute, in accordance with prevailing legislation, branches, offices, representatives and agencies
both in the U.S.S.R. and abroad, as well as participate in all kinds of combines, societies, associations
and organizations which correspond to the tasks of the Combine;
d) acquire, alienate, and let or take on lease any kind of movable or immovable property.
Capital
8. The chartered capital of the All-Union Combine "Sudoimport" is established at the sum of five
million rubles.
Administration of the Combine
9. The administration of the All-Union Combine "Sudoimport" is carried out by the President of
the Combine and his Deputies, in the order established by law.
The division of labor between the President and his Deputies is established by the President of the
Combine.
1o. The President of the Combine administers all the affairs and property of the Combine, performs
and concludes, in the name of the Combine, all kinds of contracts, transactions and other juridical acts,
and in the affairs of the Combine deals directly with all institutions, enterprises, and persons.
ii. All contracts and transactions in foreign trade concluded in Moscow by the All-Union Combine
"Sudoimport" must be signed by two persons, of whom one must be the President of the Combine or his
Deputy, and the other, a person authorized to sign foreign trade transactions by a power of attorney
signed by the President of the Combine. Bills of exchange and other monetary obligations in foreign
trade issued by the Combine in Moscow must bear the signatures of the President or his Deputy and
the Treasurer of the Combine.
All foreign trade contracts, transactions and acts performed for acquiring or leasing of immovable
property, as well as the issuance of bills of exchange and other monetary obligations, outside Moscow, both
within the territory of the USSR and abroad, must be signed by two persons who have received, under
powers of attorney signed by the President of the Combine, the right of first and second signing.
Accounting and Distribution of Profits
z2. The fiscal year of the All-Union Combine "Sudoimport" runs from x January to 31 December of
each calendar year.
13. Accounts and balance sheets of the All-Union Combine "Sudoimport" are drawn up and issued
in the procedure established by the laws and regulations prevailing in the U.S.S.R.
14. The procedure for distribution of the net profit of the All-Union Combine "Sudoimport" is de-
termined by the laws and regulations prevailing in the U.S.S.R.
Liquidation
5. The procedure for liquidation of the All-Union Combine "Sudoimport" is determined by the laws
and regulations prevailing in the U.S.S.R.
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footnote.1 7  Apart from the foreign trade combines, a very few other state organs
are specially empowered to carry on foreign trade within strict limits of authority.'8
Despite its legal autonomy, the foreign trade combine is also part of the Soviet
state monopoly of foreign trade. The formation of the combine is decreed by the
Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union. Its charter is issued by the Ministry of
Foreign Trade. Further, although mention of this fact is omitted from the charter,
the Minister of Foreign Trade names both the president and vice-president of the
combine, and they are subordinate to him administratively and subject to discipline
by him. The Ministry of Foreign Trade may also dissolve a foreign trade combine,
' The following is adapted from P.A. CHERVIAKOV, ORGANIZATSIIA i TEKHNIKA, VNESHNEI ToRsoVLi
SSSR [ORGANzATIoN AND TECHNIQUE OF FOREIGN TRADE OF THE U.S.S.R.] 41-43 (958).
Combines which only export: (i) Mashinoeksport: power-generating, electrical, mining, hoisting,
metallurgical, chemical and food-processing equipment, and equipment for light industry; (2) Avtoeksport:
automobiles, tractors, agricultural machinery, and control and measuring instruments.
Combines which only import: (3) Tekhnopromimport: equipment for chemical, construction, food,
pulp, light, resin, and polygraphic industries, automobiles, tractors, agricultural machinery, telegraphic,
television, and radio equipment, control and measuring instruments, and laboratory equipment.
Combines which both export and import: (4) Stankoimport: machine tools, metal forging equipment,
instruments, ball-bearings, measuring tools, hard alloys, abrasives, film equipment, and optical apparatus;
(5) Sudoimport: ships, their repair and re-equipment; (6) Promsyr'eimport: ferrous metals, railroad
materials, ferrous alloys, high quality steels, pipes, and hardware; (7) Raznoimport: light metals, rolled
light metals, rubber, and synthetic rubber products; (8) Eksportles: timber materials in finished and un-
finished form, cellulose, paper, and paper goods; (9) Soiuzpromeksport: products of mining and fuel in-
dustries and fertilizers; (io) Soiuzkhimeksport: chemical and medicinal goods and raw materials; (i)
Soiuznefteksport: oil and oil products; (12) Soiuzpushnina: fur pelts and their products, bristles, horsehair,
and carpets; (14) Eksportlen: cotton, wool, flax, fabrics, thread and similar products; (13) Eksportkhleb:
grain, legume and oil cultures, oil cakes, seeds, and bran; (15) Prodintorg: food products other than those
within the nomenclature of Eksportkhleb and animals; (s6) Raznoeksport: tobacco and tobacco products,
hides, animal waste, leather products, and building materials; (17) Mezhdunarodnaia kniga: books, peri-
odicals, music, reproductions, stamps, articles for mechanical reproduction of music, and articles for fine arts;
(18) Soveksportfil'm: moving-picture films; (i9) Vostokintorg: various goods in trade with the Mongolian
People's Republic, the Sinkiang-Uigurski autonomous region of the Chinese People's Republic, Afghanistan,
and Iran; (2o) Mashinoimport: imports of power equipment and electrical and petroleum hoisting equip-
ment, and imports and exports of railroad rolling stock.
Combines engaged in transport: (2I) Sovfrakht: freighting of Soviet and foreign cargo, expediting,
transfer of cargoes, and transit operations; (22) Avtovneshtransport: transfer by automobile and river trans-
port of export and import cargoes between the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese People's Republic, Mongolian
People's Republic, Afghanistan, and Iran.
Combines engaged in publishing and tourist operations: (23) Vneshtorgizdat: publication of books,
brochures, journals, bulletins, and prospectuses on questions of foreign trade, and catalogue and advertising
materials; (24) Intourist (joint stock company): organization of travel and service of foreign tourists in the
U.S.S.R. and of Soviet tourists abroad.
In addition, the supply to foreign countries of complete enterprises and the rendering of technical
aid, as well as the conduct of estimating and designing work, are carried on by (25) Tekhnoeksport, (26)
Tekhnopromeksport, (27) Tiazhpromeksport, and (28) Prommasheksport--each dealing in different types
of industry.
"3 Soveksportfil'm, which exports and imports moving pictures, cinematographic equipment, and re-
lated products, is subordinate to the Ministry of Culture of the U.S.S.R. and is not, technically speaking,
an export-import combine. Skotoimport, which imports cattle for slaughter from countries of the East,
is subordinate to the Ministry of Food Products. The Academy of Sciences has the right to purchase
books and other scientific materials abroad. In addition, in connection with the Soviet program of
technical assistance, some economic ministries and their chief administrations have been given the right
to appear as parties to foreign trade contracts together with the foreign trade combine Tekhnoeksport,
the economic ministry or chief administration being responsible for the production aspects of the contract
and Tekhnoeksport being responsible for the commercial aspects. Pozdniakov, supra note 3, at 14-15.
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upon authorization of the Council of Ministers.'9  It may transfer basic capital from
one to another; moreover, the annual net profit of the combine is turned over to the
state as state income.20
Certain major obstructions to normal commercial intercourse are removed by
the conferring of legal autonomy upon the foreign trade combine. Thus, the com-
bine is not immune from process or from liability under Soviet law, and it does not
claim immunity under the laws of other countries, at least in suits arising out of
commercial transactions.' Moreover, it accepts the traditional institutional frame-
work of commercial custom and commercial law which is the common heritage of
exporters and importers, bankers, shipowners, marine insurance underwriters, and
other persons engaged in private trade throughout the world; the Soviet law and
practice regarding c.i.f., f.o.b., f.as., and similar types of international trade contracts,
letters of credit, and other financing devices, ocean bills of lading, marine insurance
policies, and, in general, the entire range of commercial techniques of international
trade does not differ in nature from that of Germany, France, Italy, England, the
United States, and other countries which have inherited the law merchant.22
On the other hand, the fact that the Soviet foreign trade combine is part of the
state monopoly of foreign trade introduces some legal complications into commercial
relationships with private traders. One such complication arises when the Ministry
of Foreign Trade refuses to issue an export license to a foreign trade combine. In
a recent case before the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission in Moscow, it was
argued-unsuccessfully-by the non-Soviet party that the connection is so close
between the foreign trade combine which made the original export contract and
the Ministry of Foreign Trade which subsequently refused to grant license that the
refusal to perform the contract cannot be excused on the ground of force inajeure or
supervening impossibility.
Another complication arising from the fact that the foreign trade combines are
state organizations is connected with the severe rules of Soviet law regarding ultra
vires transactions-rules which are designed to prevent officials of state organizations
from acting in a manner which is contrary to the interests of the state. Thus, article
thirty of the R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code provides: "A legal transaction made for a purpose
contrary to law, or in fraud of law, as well as a transaction directed to the obvious
" 'Cf. Genkin, supra note I5, at 6z-62. Dissolution or reorganization is regulated by a decree of
the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. of March 27,
1936, SoBAwNIE ZAxoNov SSSR [CorEizrioN OF LAws oF T"HE U.S.S.R.] no. 18, art. 1s (936).
o Genkin, supra note 15, at 70.
21Cf. charter of Sudoinport, supra note 16, § 7(a). The waiver of immunity in the charter of
the combine may be revocable under the doctrine of absolute immunity of some countries. In a 1948
libel of the Soviet vessel Rossia by an injured passenger, immunity was claimed and granted, but the
ship was owned by the Soviet Ministry of Marine Fleet rather than by an independent combine. Lorina
v. The Rossia, File No. 18767 (E.D.N.Y. 1948) (complaint dismissed without opinion).
"Much of this transnational body of legal concepts and institutions is accepted in trade among the
Communist countries themselves. See Berman, Unification of Contract Clauses in Trade between Member-
Countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid, 7 INT'L & CoMp. L. Q. 659, 664 (1958).
"
3 See infra note 34.
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prejudice of the State, shall be invalid." Article 147 provides: "In the event that
a contract is invalid as illegal or directed to the obvious prejudice of the State
(Article 30), none of the parties shall have the right to claim from the other restitu-
tion of that which the other party has performed under the contract. Unjust en-
richment shall be collected for the benefit of the State (Article 402)." In comment-
ing on the applicability of these provisions to a foreign trade contract which is
ultra vires the Soviet foreign trade combine that concluded it, Professor D. M.
Genkin, a leading Soviet authority, states: "However, judicial and arbitrational prac-
tice in those instances when there is not a malicious violation of the plan permits
the application of consequences not under Article 147 but under Article 151 of the
Civil Code of the RSFSR, i.e., permits bilateral return (restitution) of all that has
been received under the ultra vires transaction."24
Article i51 provides: "Where a contract is declared invalid owing to violation of
the form required by law (Article 29) or owing to mistake of one of the parties
(Article 32), each of the parties must restore to the other all that which he received
under the contract. . . ." In addition, it provides that compensation for damage
to property shall be paid by the party liable for the circumstance which caused the
mistake, and that compensation in damages as for breach of contract shall be paid
if the mistake was caused by gross negligence.
The statement that in cases involving foreign trade contracts, Soviet courts and
arbitration tribunals should apply article 151 instead of article 147 where the in-
validity is not due to a malicious violation of plan indicates an awareness on the
part of Soviet jurists of the difficulty which would be created if the severe policy of
Soviet law concerning illegal contracts were applied to foreign trade contracts. At
the same time, it is not clear how article 151 could be applied where the form of the
contract was proper and there was no mistake of fact, and yet the plan was violated
without malice-as where a foreign trade combine agrees to export an article which
it knows it is not authorized to export, believing, nevertheless, that it is acting in the
best interests of the Soviet state. Professor Genkin argues that the application of
either article 147 or article 151 in such a situation would be "completely unaccept-
able," but he cites no authority for this view.25
"It would be incorrect to consider," he adds, "that the conclusion and execution by
foreign trade combines of ultra vires transactions with a foreign trade partner
should not incur any consequences whatever. The persons who concluded such a
transaction on the side of the Soviet foreign trade combine, and who executed it,
should be brought to disciplinary responsibility, and in proper instances also to crim-
inal responsibility, for violation of the charter of the combine. ' 26
In this connection, it may be mentioned that under article 59(11) of the R.S.F.S.R.
Criminal Code and corresponding articles of the criminal codes of the other con-
stituent republics of the Soviet Union, violation of the statute on the state monopoly
"' Genkin, supra note 15, at 67. 25 Id. at 68.
20 ibid.
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of foreign trade is punishable as an "especially dangerous crime against the admin-
istrative order" by deprivation of liberty from three to ten years, with total or partial
confiscation of property. "A particular instance of the violation of the monopoly of
foreign trade," states one Soviet writer, "is the conclusion on the territory of the
U.S.S.R. of trade transactions with foreign organizations and firms which may carry
on activity on the territory of the U.S.S.R. only on condition they receive special
permission, and such permission does not exist, and also the assumption of the
authority of an agent for the purpose of performing transactions for such organiza-
tions and persons."2
It is not intended by the above discussion to suggest that the problem of ultra
vires transactions is of pressing importance as an immediate obstacle to trade between
the Soviet Union and foreign countries. The problem, nevertheless, sheds light on
the general question of the extent to which rules designed primarily to meet the
domestic needs of an economy operated and administered chiefly by state agencies
are applicable to dealings with foreign firms. At the same time, the severe sanctions
imposed on Soviet officials for a violation of the monopoly of foreign trade have a
practical bearing upon business relationships between foreign trade officials and
foreign firms.28
3. All-Union Chamber of Commerce
The establishment of the All-Union Chamber of Commerce provides another
illustration of the attempt of the Soviet regime in the field of foreign trade to adapt
the state monopoly to the requirements of an international order. In many ways,
this organization resembles chambers of commerce established by private traders in
market economies. It is a juridical person, with the right to acquire, alienate, and
lease movable and immovable property; to enter into transactions within the limits
set by its charter; and to sue and be sued in court.20 Its functions include those of
establishing links with economic organizations abroad, especially chambers of com-
merce, export institutes, and trade exchanges; participating in the international con-
gresses of chambers of commerce; reception of foreign trade and industrial delega-
tions, and sending of similar delegations abroad; organization of foreign and do-
mestic trade and industry fairs both within the Soviet Union and abroad; handling of
Soviet patent and trademark applications and claims abroad, and representation of for-
eigners in such applications and claims in the Soviet Union; issuance of certificates
of origin of goods exported from the Soviet Union;30 issuance of certificates of
• Pozdniakov, supra note 3, at S8.
* Sanctions for violation of the laws on state secrets and on counterrevolutionary crimes are discussed
infra note 52.
1 " This and the following information is drawn in part from Pozdniakov, supra note 3, at 33 et seq.,
and in part from conversations with officers of the Chamber. The charter of the All-Union Chamber of
Commerce issued by the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., August 2, 1943, which is
quoted by Pozdniakov and other Soviet writers, is not available.
" Certificates of origin of goods imported into the U.S.S.R. are issued by trade delegations and trade
agencies of the U.S.S.R. abroad or by consular institutions of the U.S.S.R. where such trade delegations
or agencies do not exist.
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quality after expert examination; and arbitration of trade and maritime disputes
through two arbitral tribunals, the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission and
the Maritime Arbitration Commission.
The charter of the All-Union Chamber of Commerce, as quoted by Soviet writers,
specifically declares it to be a "social" organization, and hence it is not, under Soviet
law, a "state" organization. Social organizations are distinguished from state organ-
izations under Soviet law by the fact that membership in them is voluntary and
the members participate to a relatively high degree in the administration of their
affairs.31 In addition, a social organization, as contrasted with a state organization,
is not legally subordinate to any particular organ of the government. Nevertheless,
article one of the charter of the All-Union Chamber of Commerce is quoted as
stating that the Ministry of Foreign Trade "exercises general supervision" over its
activity.
2
The membership of the All-Union Chamber of Commerce includes, however,
many organizations other than those which participate directly in foreign trade.
There are reported to be several hundred or more members, drawn from various
branches of industry and commerce, and it is emphasized by Soviet officials that
the functions of the Chamber include participation in activities connected with
domestic trade.
The fact that the All-Union Chamber of Commerce-at least to the extent that
it participates in activities connected with foreign trade-helps to exercise the state
foreign trade monopoly, and that its members are often officials of state organiza-
tions, raises the question whether the arbitration commissions which are attached
to it, and whose panels are appointed by its presidium, are sufficiently independent
of the Soviet foreign trade combines to be considered impartial in cases of disputes
between them and foreign firms. There is much evidence that the Foreign Trade
Arbitration Commission has striven to achieve a reputation for impartiality (without
which, indeed, it would be difficult to secure consent of foreign parties to its juris-
diction). It has shown a thorough familiarity with the commercial law and com-
mercial custom of many countries; its fifteen-member panel of arbitrators are,. for
the most part, prominent professors of law or economics who are experts in interna-
tional trade; its procedure is fair; it gives reasoned opinions in connection with its
awards; and it has decided many cases in favor of the non-Soviet party. 3 Althouigh
3 Cf. 2 P. I. KutDiuAvrsEv (ED.), IURIDICH.sKI SLOVAR' [LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA] 23 (1956). Other
social organizations are: the Communist Party, the trade unions, the civil defense societies, scientific and
technical organizations, sports societies, and others.
8" R.S.F.S.R. CIVIL CODE art. z8 (1956) (U.S.S.R.) is applicable to social organizations. KuDRiAvrsEv
(ED.), op. cit supra note 3r. Art. 18 states: "The existence of a juridical person may be terminated by the
proper organ of government authority if the juridical person deviates from the purpose defined by the
charter or contract or if the activities of its organs (general meeting, management) deviate in a direction
contrary to the interests of the state." In the light of the provision of the charter quoted in the text, it is
very likely that the Ministry of Foreign Trade would be "the proper organ of government authority"
should a question of terminating the All-Union Chamber of Commerce under art. 18 ever arise.
This conclusion is based, in part, upon a study of original reports of more than twenty awards on
file in the archives of the Commission, which the writer conducted in Moscow in May 1957; in part, upon
interviews with Western businessmen who have had cases in the Commission; and in part, upon numerous
494 LAW AND CONfEMPORARY PROBLEMS
its recent decision against an Israeli oil import corporation caused considerable ad-
verse comment in the Western press, that case had peculiar political implications
which render it atypical 3 4 Nor were the legal issues as simple as many critics of
the award have supposed.I5
It has been suggested, however, that "the tribunals of the Communist Chambers
of Commerce are, in fact, administrative agencies of their respective governments in
the guise of arbitration, and not arbitration tribunals at all. 301 In support of this
view, it is stated that both the Soviet Chamber of Commerce and its Foreign Trade
Arbitration Commission are "public institutions created by the state, with responsi-
bilities of a purely public nature and with secretariats and arbitration panels unavoid-
ably composed of civil servants. ' T Such a position would deny the reality of the
reports of cases in Soviet books and periodicals and in some reports in non-Soviet literature. A detailed
description of a proceeding in the Commission is given by a West German attorney who represented a Ham-
burg company in a suit against the timber export combine Eksportles in x956; see Shaer, Bericht fiber die
Durchiiihrung eines Schiedsverfahrens vor der Aussenhandels-Arbitragekommission bd der Handelskammer
der U.d.S.S.R. in Moskau," 3 RECHT DERE INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAIr' 75, 76 (x956). The work of
the Commission is analyzed in DmiTRii F. RAaszArrsEv, VNESHNETORGOVyi ARBITRAZH i SSSR [FoREIGN
TRADE ARBrrATION IN THE U.S.S.R.] (195z) and (1957), and reports of its activities are occasionally
given in the monthly journal of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Vneshniaia Torgovlia. Cf. Hazard, State
Trading and Arbitration, in MARTIN DoassE (ED.), INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION: A ROAD TO WORLD-
WIDE CoOPERATION 93 (1958). Decisions of the Foreign Trade and Maritime Arbitration Commissions arc
discussed in Pisar, Soviet Confict of Laws in International Commercial Transactions, 70 HARv. L. REv. 593
(1957).
' The case was that of Jordan Investment Ltd. v. Soiuznefteksport, involving a claim of over two
million dollars arising from the defendant's failure to deliver oil as provided by contract; the defense
was denial to the defendant of an export license by the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The decision is
reported in N.Y. Times, June 2o, 1958, p. i, col. z; see also id., Dec. 5, 1957, P. 21, col. 3. Ch,
Observer (London), June 26, 1958; Manchester Guardian, June 27, 1958. More or less indiscriminate
indignation over the decision was expressed in many quarters. Cf. Notes on Israeli-Soviet Oil Arbitration,
i3 ARE. J. 159 (1959).
The political background of the case consisted in the invasion of Egypt by Israel in November s956,
which the Soviet Government considered an act of aggression; in the fact that the Israeli oil import
corporation is itself controlled by the Israeli Government; and in the fact that a large amount of pressure
concerning the case was brought to bear on the Soviet Government by traders from many countries, which
ultimately may have produced the opposite effect from that which was intended.
" The Israeli plaintiff argued that the connection between the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade and
the defendant oil export combine is so close that the Ministry's refusal to grant export licenses could not
be treated as creating a supervening impossibility under the force maicure clause of the contract. This
attempt to pierce the combine's corporate veil was bound to fail, however, since such legal autonomy is,
as indicated above, a basic principle of the entire Soviet system of foreign trade; to reject it would be to
require the Soviet state to conduct all its foreign trade in its own name-a solution which would prob-
ably create more difficulties for non-Soviet traders than it would solve. Having chosen to contract with
the Soviet combine in Moscow, the plaintiff was in no position to deny its independence under Soviet
law. On the other hand, the tribunal's holding that the Soviet exporter was not liable for damages
caused by its government's denial of the license, there being no provision of the contract expressly
covering- this contingency, is probably contrary to general international commercial understanding, al-
though judicial decisions on this point are not uniform throughout the world. It should be noted,
however, that the Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission has in at least one other case involving
the denial of an export license taken a very broad view of force majeure-and to the disadvantage of
the Soviet import combine. Moreover, the contract in the Israeli case provided that there should be no
liability for nonperformance "due to any other cause whatever beyond the control of the defaulting party"
-language which is broader than the conventional phraseology of force majenre.
.
5 Pisar, Treatment of Communist Foreign Trade Arbitration in Western Courts, in DOMKE '(ED.),
op. cit. supra note 33, at IOI, Io6.
-" -' Ibid.
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Soviet distinction between "social" and "state" organizations-a denial which gains
some force by virtue of the above-quoted provision of the charter of the All-Union
Chamber of Commerce (a "social" organization) that it is "under the supervision"
of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (a "state" organization); it would also deny the
reality of the distinction between a university professor and a civil servant.
More telling, perhaps, is the fact that under article 124 of the Soviet Constitution,
the members of the Communist Party are stated to be the "leading core of all organ-
izations, both social and state"; given strict Party control over all aspects of social
and economic life, it may easily be supposed that Soviet arbitrators are directly
responsible to Soviet national interests as interpreted by the Party leadership.
Such an analysis must somehow explain the fact that the decisions of the Foreign
Trade Arbitration Commission in the past twenty-five years give no indication of
any lack of independence-at least if the Israeli case is left out of consideration.
If it is assumed that the arbitrators are under instructions from the Ministry of For-
eign Trade (or the Communist Party), it must also be assumed that those instruc-
tions are: Behave as though you were impartial!3" One might also suppose, how-
ever, that no such instructions are needed and that the arbitrators, as well as the
Ministry of Foreign Trade, understand that the success of the tribunal, in the
long run, depends on its international reputation for objectivity and fairness. In
addition, Western concepts of the monolithic communist state may be oversimpli-
fied: Soviet domestic state-trading and industrial enterprises have had a long experi-
ence of impartial adjudication of disputes arising out of their contracts with each
other, and it may simply be taken for granted by both officials and arbitrators
that foreign trade combines are subject to similar controls, although the opposing
parties are foreigners F9
If one assumes that the Soviet arbitrators are impartial, in fact, there remains the
SBCf. id. at 107: "If [the Soviet arbitrators] are at all influenced by the State, it is more likely than
not that their attitude takes the form of what may be called 'premeditated impartiality.'" In and of itself,
of course, premeditated impartiality is the best kind. The vice of an "instructed" impartiality is in the
possibility that the instructions might be withdrawn in a particular case.
" Interestingly enough, the term Arbitrazlh is used for both the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commis-
sion (Vneshtorgarbitrazh) and for the state agencies which decide contract disputes between state enter-
prises of different ministries or branches of the economy (Gosarbitrazh). (There are several hundred
thousand such disputes decided annually.) Despite the resemblance of the term to the Western word
"arbitration," it does not have that connotation in Soviet domestic adjudication. Indeed, there is another
term in Russian for an arbitration tribunal, treteiskii sud, and a statute of 1924 recognizes the validity
of awards of such tribunals. The 1956 legal encyclopedia concludes its discussion of that statute by
stating: "In the U.S.S.R. citizens do not use arbitration tribunals [treteiskii sud], since they resort with
full confidence to the people's courts. At the All-Union Chamber of Commerce there exist as permanently
functioning arbitration tribunals [treteiskii sud] the Foreign Trade Arbitration [arbitrazhnaia] Commis-
sion and the Maritime Arbitration [arbitrazhnaia] Commission." KuDRIAvTsFv (ED.), op. cit. supra note
3, at 517. On Gosarbitrazs, see generally HAnoLD J. BEEmAN, JUsTICE IN' RUSSIA 63-66 (195o); 13 de-
cisions of Gosarbitrazh are reported and discussed in HAROLD J. BERMAN & BORIS A. KoNsTANTINOVSKY, SOVIET
LAW IN ACTION: THE RECOLLECTED CASES OF A SOVIET LAWYER 33 et seq. (1953). The fact that legality in
the domestic economic sphere is accepted and believed in by the Soviet leadership, and is given institutional
expression in a body of law which is objectively applied, has an important bearing upon the question of the
nature and quality of Soviet foreign trade adjudication. Cf. Berman, Soviet Justice and Soviet Tyranny,
55 COLUm. L. REv. 795 (1955).
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question whether their links with the Soviet export-import combines are not so
close as to cast doubt on their legal capacity for impartiality. So long as these
three conditions co-exist: (a) that they are appointed by the All-Union Chamber
of Commerce, (b) that the All-Union Chamber of Commerce is under the super-
vision of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and (c) that the Ministry of Foreign
Trade appoints the heads of the export-import combines-so long will their independ-
ence be subject to potential abuse.
B. Integrated National Economic Planning As the
Basis of Soviet Foreign Trade
Soviet writers contrast the planned character of Soviet foreign trade with the
"spontaneous, plan-less character" of the foreign trade of capitalist countries, "whose
economy develops spontaneously." In the Soviet Union, "foreign trade is supposed
to be subordinated to the requirements of the national economic plan. Plans for
foreign trade are supposed to proceed from the general tasks of the national eco-
nomic plan.... ." These tasks are: "a) guaranteeing the independence of the develop-
ment of the national economy, b) the victory .. . of the socialist system of economy
and the gradual transition to communism, c) rejection of disproportions in the
national economy and the creation of necessary reserves for the struggle against such
disproportions."4
The economic tasks of Soviet planning are reflected in the import and export
policies of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Soviet economic independence, rapid
industrialization ("transition to communism"), and the building up of reserves
against future unfavorable economic contingencies, are goals which are reached,
in the first instance, by economizing exports. Exporting is viewed as necessary in
order to earn the foreign exchange needed for imports, but not as something which
is desirable in and of itself, for its own sake. If there were no need for imports,
there would be no economic pressure to export. Secondly, the economic goals of
Soviet planning limit imports in general to those goods which either cannot be
manufactured or produced at home at all, or which it would be very difficult or
very costly to manufacture at home. The mere fact that it is more costly (but not
much more costly) for the Soviet Union to manufacture cosmetics, for example,
than to import them from abroad would not in itself induce the Soviet planners
and administrators to authorize their importation, for they do not operate on a theory
of comparative costs, except in a very rough sense. Indeed, they have no precise way
of estimating comparative costs, in view of the fact that the ruble is a purely in-
ternal currency, and even internally there is not a free market. Even if they could
measure comparative costs precisely, they would not base their planning upon them,
for one of their goals is to free Soviet economic development from dependence upon
foreign markets, rather than to integrate their economy with foreign economies.
It is, of course, true that in economies in which foreign trade develops more
4
0
SMIRNOV & LiuIMOV (EDS.), op. cit. supra note 9, at 9, 17, 18.
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spontaneously and without planning of the Soviet type, there are, in many cases,
governmental controls designed to restrict exports of goods needed at home and to
give priority to imports of industrial goods and other goods not easily manufactured
at home. The striking difference is that in a capitalist economy, there is, by defini-
tion, a large class of people, private businessmen, whose individual interests are not
identical with those of the state and who exert a pressure toward free multilateral
trade. Individual exporters and importers impose limits on the extent to which
the state can control foreign trade for national ends, whether economic or political.
The individual exporter, for example, views exports-even of scarce items-as in
themselves desirable. He makes a profit from them. Similarly, the individual con-
sumer may prefer to import from abroad goods which it would be only slightly
more expensive to buy at home. A government in a capitalist economy must reckon
with such individual private interests; and, indeed, it is often itself sympathetic
with them. In the Soviet Union, such pressure for foreign trade is exerted by two
dozen export-import combines and by some ministries and some economic organiza-
tions, all of which are headed by state officials who are supposed to view the interests
of their own organizations in the light of the total interests of the country.
i. Techniques of foreign trade planning
Soviet literature reveals very little of the concrete details of foreign trade plan-
nng, and Soviet foreign trade officials are reluctant to reveal to foreigners the
actual methods by which decisions are reached as to what to import and what to
export.4 It is not clear to what extent the Ministry of Foreign Trade plays an
independent part in the formulation of the annual export and import plans,4" to what
extent the various economic ministries can influence the decision to import or export
particular products, to what extent the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can determine
patterns of trade, to what extent the State Bank influences foreign trade planning,
and so on.
The accounts of Soviet foreign trade planning which are available to foreign
scholars do, however, make clear the high degree to which the immediate producing
and consuming enterprises, and even their chief administrations and ministries, are
insulated from direct contact with foreign markets. In importing, the foreign trade
-combine, on the basis of its import plan, requests from the appropriate ministry or
-chief administration specifications of the particular products which the organization
is authorized by the plan to purchase abroad. On the basis of such specifications,
the combine goes onto the foreign market-subject to limitations imposed by Soviet
" in a personal interview with First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade S.A. Borisov in May 1957, the
-writer stated that American businessmen and scholars are interested in obtaining more information on how
Soviet foreign trade is planned. Mr. Borisov replied: "How we plan our foreign trade is our own
business, and we are not going to tell you or anyone else."
" A Soviet book on foreign trade states: "In 1953, in order to raise the responsibility of ministers of
the U.S.S.R. for the tasks assigned to them, and also taking into account the importance of securing
timely decisions of economic questions connected with the fulfillme-t of tl'e ta'ks imp ,ed n m;n-
istries, the rights of ministers of the U.S.S.R. were significantly extended." However, not a word is said
as to what new rights they were given. Pozdniakov, supra note 3, at 21.
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bilateral trade agreements 4 -- to procure the goods. Armed with an import permit
from the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the combine makes a contract with the foreign
supplier; as a rule, it only then enters into a contract with the domestic customer 44 _
and, indeed, if it chooses not to enter into such a contract, the domestic customer is,
nevertheless, bound to buy the goods by the import permit issued by the Ministry
of Foreign Trade. The price which the domestic customer pays for the goods is
the price of similar goods in the internal market;, or, if there are no similar goods, a
price fixed by the Ministry of Foreign Trade,45 plus a customs duty. The amount
of the customs duty is apparently supposed to be equivalent to transportation ex-
penses and the organization's commission.
In exporting, the obligation of a producer organization to take the necessary pre-
liminary steps to produce particular goods for export is created by the annual national
economic plan and, more particularly, by the allocation of export contingents by
the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union. On the basis of a corresponding export
plan, the foreign trade combine presents to the appropriate ministry or chief admin-
istration an order (zakaz-nariad) which obligates the ministry or chief administration
to deliver the goods. The ministry, or chief administration, issues a corresponding
zakaz-naritd (or transfers the original zakaz-nariad) to one of its subordinate pro-
ducing enterprises. The zakaz-nariad, which contains the number and date of an
export permit issued by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, creates a legal obligation to
deliver on the part of the ministry or chief administration; again, no contract is
required. 46
Either before or after it issues orders to supplier organizations, the foreign trade
's See infra 499-500.
""If the foreign supplier does not agree to the conditions based on the specifications [presented by
the domestic producer] the combine turns to its principal with the suggestion to change the technical
conditions if possible." Finogenov, Pravovye Voprosy Importnykh Operatsii [Legal Questions of Import
Operations], in GENKIN (ED.), Op. cit. supra note 3, at iio, 112-13.
"'If the imported goods are sold to the public, the Ministry of Foreign Trade may apparently set any
price it wishes; if they are machines, equipment, or means of transportation, the price is based on the
cost of the goods plus a supplementary amount measured according to rules adopted by the Ministry
of Foreign Trade. Id. at 124. It is not indicated on what basis the rules for the supplementary
amount are framed or at what rate of exchange the foreign price is translated into rubles.
'In Soviet domestic trade, direct procurement or allocation of goods without contract is confined to
relatively few kinds of transactions. One Soviet writer states: "The practice of non-contractual deliveries
lowers the responsibility of the suppliers, often leads to shipment of goods which the consumer does
not need, to non-rational transshipments, to the growth of abnormal deficiencies, to overstocking. In
particular, the practice of non-contractual deliveries of ferrous metals, coal, and oil products has
[in recent years] been abolished.
"At the present time the creation of obligations by non-contractual means is permitted by law as an
exception from the general rule only in particular instances.
"Thus, in particular, to the number of obligations arising by non-contractual means belong obliga-
tions for delivery of goods for export ....
".-..This [elimination of contracts between the domestic suppliers and the foreign trade combines
in October 1940] guaranteed to the all-union foreign trade combine the possibility of more operational,
resourceful, flexible work in connection with their appearance on foreign markets and with fulfillment
of their contractual obligations with foreign trading partners." Zatsepin, Prapovye Voprosy Postavki
Tovarov na Esksport [Legal Questions of Supply of Goods for Export], in GErNKIN (ED.), op. Cit. supra
note 3, at 89, 9I-92.
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combine goes out onto foreign markets-again, as limited by intergovernmental
trade agreements-and makes contracts with foreign purchasers. It pays the supplier
after delivery of the goods, at the established domestic wholesale price.7 It receives
a commission from the proceeds of the sale abroad and transfers the balance (after
subtracting the price paid to the domestic supplier) to the state treasury. It is not
stated in Soviet literature, so far as this writer can discover, how the combine's com-
mission is translated from foreign currency into rubles.
2. Problems arising from the planned character of Soviet foreign trade
The underlying problem arising from the fact that Soviet foreign trade is in-
tegrally (or "globally") planned and that of its Western trading partners is to a
considerable extent free, or "spontaneous," is the lack of reciprocity which exists be-
tween the immediate trading partners. A commercial contract is an instrument
whereby each of two parties gives up something to the other in the expectation of
being better off himself as a result. The reciprocal exchange of sacrifices makes them
both wealthier. But in the case of contracts between a capitalist trader and a Soviet
foreign trade combine, the kinds of advantages achieved are apt to be quite differ-
ent for each partner. The Soviet foreign trade combine considers itself better off
only if the transaction conforms to the plan and, in that sense, is of benefit to the
Soviet state; whereas the capitalist considers himself better off if he has made a
profit, even though the state may have suffered a net economic or political or
military loss.
It is the absence of reciprocity in this fundamental sense which gives rise to
particular difficulties in the attempt to put trade between planned and market econo-
mies on the basis of commercial considerations only4 Also, it is the lack of
reciprocity in this sense which makes it seem desirable to some governments of
market economies that trade between their countries and countries of planned
economy be regulated-as the Soviet leaders prefer that it be regulated-by bilateral
trade agreements, with programs of exchanges of particular goods in particular
quantities over a period of years, so that the planned character of the foreign trade
of planned economies may be taken advantage of by both sides and not merely by
one.4 o
It is apparent that the planning, administration, and operation of a system of
foreign trade such as the Soviet is made easier by such bilateral programmed trade
agreements. On the basis of the export contingents listed in such agreements, the
Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union can make an allocation of export con-
"Ibid.
48 The commercial-considerations formula is used in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
as a means of controlling state trading. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Mar. Io, 1955,
art. 17, ['957] 8 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1767, T.I.A.S. No. 3930 (effective Oct. 7, 1957).
" Over 30 such trade agreements between the Soviet Union and noncommunist countries and over
240 such agreements between all countries of the free world and of the Sino-Soviet bloc are listed
in MiKEsELL & BEHR, AN, op. cit. supra note i, app. table I, at 103. In addition, all the communist
countries have such trade agreements with each other.
500 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PRtOBLEMS
tingents among the producing and consuming ministries, chief administrations, and
subordinate producing enterprises.5" Similarly, import planning can be geared into
the bilateral programs of exchanges.
On the other hand, for private traders in market economies, the establishment of
contingents by intergovernmental agreement is a limitation upon freedom of action
which is necessarily discriminatory, although it protects the national interests of the
parties to the agreement. The Soviet Government's agreement with the Yugloslav
Government, for example, to import leather from Yugoslavia adversely affects Amer-
ican leather exporters who might otherwise be able to compete on the Soviet market.
Thus, the Soviet system puts governments of market economies in a dilemma: they
may leave their private traders to deal individually with the Soviet state-trading com-
bines and thereby sacrifice reciprocity in the sense indicated above, or they may enter
into intergovernmental agreements which ensure reciprocity on a national basis but
which necessarily interfere with the competitive position of individual traders in their
own and other countries. 51
C. The Significance of Communist Party Leadership for the
Soviet System of Foreign Trade
It would be entirely unrealistic to analyze the Soviet system of foreign trade
only in terms of state administration and economic planning, and to ignore the
fact that the administration and planning is under the control of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, a party which operates on the basis of distinctive theories
and policies. It is conceivable that a particular country could have a state monopoly
of foreign trade, conducted on the basis of a national economic plan, and not be a
country led by a Communist Party; but the fact that the Soviet Union is led by a
Communist Party and the fact that there is an opposition of political ideas and in-
terests between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the governments of
some countries of market economy add a whole other dimension to the legal problems
of trade between it and other countries.
In the preceding sections of this article, consideration has been given to certain
problems of adjustment between the Soviet system of foreign trade and that of non-
Soviet countries-problems which would exist even if those countries shared com-
mon political aims and interests. In the present section, consideration is given to
problems of trade which exist solely or primarily because of the political tensions be-
tween countries of planned economy led by a Communist Party and countries of
market economy led by parties which are not communist. Attention is here given
to problems arising because of Soviet political aims and interests; the second part of
this article will be devoted, in part, to problems arising because of American political
aims and interests.
"o Cf. Zatsepin, supra note 46, at 92 et seq. The word "contingents" in the expression "allocation
of export contingents" may be taken from the bilateral trade agreements in which the same word (in
Russian, kontingenty) is used.
" See infra 524-25.
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It is due in large part to the international political situation, and not only to the
inherent nature of a state-administered and centrally planned.system of foreign trades
that large amounts of significant economic data are kept secret by theSoviet Govern-
ment. In particular; the contents of Soviet foreign trade plans, and even the details
of the planning process, are not available to businessmen of other countries; indeed,
their divulgence by Soviet officials is subject to the laws on state secrets and on
counterrevolutionary crimes. 2 It is, therefore, impossible for a foreign businessman
to make the same kind of independent, informed estimate of market developments
in the Soviet Union that he can make of market developments. in noncommunist
countries.
Secondly, it is impossible for a foreign businessman to have confidence that
even though the Soviet customer is satisfied, political factors will not cause a change
in the plans.
Thirdly, it is difficult if not impossible for the non-Soviet businessman to make the
same kind of friendly contacts with Soviet foreign trade officials that he can make
with businessmen or government officials of noncommunist countries-contacts which
can make negotiations much easier.
Fourthly, a foreign businessman cannot set up a branch or an office in the Soviet
Union; and even if he could, he could not have free contact with Soviet producing
and consumer enterprises.52 '
Fifthly, a Western manufacturer who sells complicated machinery to the Soviet
Union usually finds it impossible, or at least highly exceptional, to be able to "service
"5 Under legislation of 1947, disclosure of a state secret was punishable by confinement in a corrective
labor camp from 8 to 12 years. State secrets were defined to include "all kinds of measures in the sphere
of foreign policy and foreign trade not contained in officially published data." Edict of June "9, 947 on
Responsibility for Disclosure of State Secrets, § i; and Decree of June 8, 1947 on the Establishment of
a List of Information Constituting State Secrets, § r2, translated in HAROLD J. BEmuAN & MiRosLAV KERNE4,
DOCU ENTS ON SOVIET MILITARY LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 100, 102 (1955). In addition, under
the notorious art. 58 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code, it is a counterrevolutionary cime to diiclose iiot
only state secrets, but also "economic information not containing a specially protected state secret .but
which by direct prohibition of law or by regulation of the director of a department, institutioq or enter-
prise is not allowed to be published." R.S.F.S.R. CRIMINAL CODE art. 58(6) (195z) (U.S.S.R.); translatd
in id. at 97-98. Recently there have been some important changes in these laws. By a decree. of the
Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union of April 28, 1956, fhe list of information constituting state
secrets June 8, 1947 was abolished and a new list substituted which is much narrower and more precis:e
than the former list, but which does include, under "information of an economic character," economic
statistics of various kinds, unpublished discoveries and inventions having important scientific or economic
significance, data on foreign exchange and precious metals, and "other data which may be added by the
Council of Ministers of the USSR to the list of information comprising state secrets." See R.S.F.S.R.
CRIMINAL CODE 143-45 (1957) (U.S.S.R.). In December 1958, a Law on Criminal Responsibility
for Crimes against the State was enacted to replace earlier laws on counterrevolutionary crimes. The text
of the law was published in Pravda, Dec. 26, 1958, p. 3; it is translated in Current Digest of the Soviet
Press, March 11, 1959, p. 4. Section x2 of the law makes punishable by deprivation of freedom from
2 to 5 years, or from 5 to 8 years if the act has grave consequences, the "disclosure of information
constituting a state secret by a person who was entrusted with such information or who gained it.in his
official capacity or work, and given the absence of elements of treason or espionage.;
- "Foreign firms which intend to conduct continuous trade activity on the territory of the USSI . ..
[must] receive special permission from the Ministry of Foreign Trade. In practice such foreignx firms
or their representatives on the territory of the USSR at the present time do not exist." Pozdniakov, supra
note 3, at 15.
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the product" and conduct the kind of technical follow-up which is almost essential
to good business relations in many fields.
Sixthly, great difficulties are put in the way of protection of foreign patents.53
Finally, visa formalities and other difficulties of access to the Soviet Union often
exist-despite substantial improvement of the situation in recent years.
All these obstacles, it is submitted, are in large part due to political factors, though
they are also due, in part, to rigid conceptions of state monopoly and of national
economic planning.
i. The use of trade for political objectives
The fact that all Soviet foreign trade is in the hands of state agencies makes it
easy for such trade to be withheld from countries or firms which have acted in a
manner which the Soviet Government considers to be hostile to its interests. Pre-
sumably Soviet export-import combines would not wish to enter into commercial
relations with such countries or firms, at least without receiving prior assurance from
the Ministry of Foreign Trade that they need not hesitate to do so. In enforcement
of such self-restraint, a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of 1927 adjures
the People's Commissariat of Foreign and Domestic Trade (as it then was) to see
to it that foreign trade operations of trade delegations and of appropriate economic
organizations be conducted "as a rule" only with those countries with which the
Soviet Union has normal diplomatic relations and in which the Soviet foreign trade
apparatus is guaranteed the possibility of normal commercial activities. 4 A further
decree of i93o authorized the same People's Commissariat to take countermeasures
against countries which restrict Soviet commercial activities, and in particular to
cut off or reduce trade with such countries, boycott shipping of such countries,
limit transit through the Soviet Union of goods to or from such countries, and cut
off or reduce the use of ports, means of communication, and bases of such countries
for transit or re-export of Soviet goods. m In 1936-39, all export combines and other
economic organizations were forbidden to export Soviet goods-including goods
which they were already under contract to export-to countries whose exchange
controls or administrative regulations did not permit Soviet organizations to
use money received for Soviet exports to pay obligations incurred in the past by such
organzations or trade delegations. Indeed, the People's Commissariat of Foreign
"' There is an adequate machinery for registration of Soviet patents by foreign nationals, under a law
of March 5, 1941, translated in 2 V. Gsovsui, SovraV CMVL LAW 361-84 (1948). However, Soviet
state organizations are not subject to the rights of the patentee if the invention was in use by them
prior to the issuance of the patent; thus, one difficulty is to determine in advance, prior to the disclosure
of the patent, whether they were, in fact, using the invention. A second difficulty is that royalties are
payable in rubles, which can be used only in the Soviet Union. A third difficulty is in securing detailed
information regarding the use of the invention after the patent has been issued. A fourth difficulty is
that in the event that the invention is of special importance to the Soviet economy, the Government
may decree its forcible alienation or compulsory licensing and may set the amount of remuneration to be
given to the inventor.
" Decree on Measures to Guarantee the Normal Course of Operations in Foreign Trade, SoBRANIa
ZAxoNov SSSR [CoL.LcTroN ov LAws op TnIE U.S.S.R.] no. 28, art. 294 (1927).
" Decree on Economic Relations with Countries Which Have Established Restrictions on Trade with
the U.S.S.R. Id. no. 53, art. 557 (1930).
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Trade was authorized to prohibit export of goods, and also to stop goods already
dispatched, to countries "whose legislation, administrative regulations, administrative
and judicial practice or established exchange restrictions would create unfavorable
conditions for the foreign trade of the USSR. 5
"These decrees of the Soviet government, directed to the defense of the foreign
trade of the USSR from discriminatory measures of imperialistic states, do not
exhaust, however, all possibilities of the Ministry of Foreign Trade for protection
of the economic interests of the Soviet state," a Soviet writer states.57
From the very fact of the presence in the Soviet Union of a state monopoly of foreign trade,
whose realization is imposed on the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the conclusion must
be drawn that it has the right to prohibit particular Soviet organizations to conclude
transactions with individual firms which have an incorrect attitude [neloiial'no otnosiash-
chimisia] to the Soviet Union and to Soviet organizations, and also to repeal previously
issued permits for the performance of transactions with them, and that it has the right
to dissolve transactions which bring clear economic or other damage to the Soviet state.
Not so long ago, for example, "Sovfrakht" [the Soviet shipping combine] concluded a
contract for the hire of a vessel (time charter) with a foreign firm. Under the contract the
shipowner was obliged to provide a vessel for carriage of Soviet cargoes between various
ports, with passage in particular to Chinese ports. At the time provided in the contract the
firm grossly violated the contract and forbade its vessel to pass into ports of the Chinese
People's Republic, relying on orders of its government based on the unlawful decision of
the General Assembly of the U.N. In answer to this the Ministry of Foreign Trade for-
bade "Sovfrakht" to engage in further conduct of operations with the aforementioned
steamship company.
In addition to taking retaliatory measures against businessmen of countries which
restrict trade with the Soviet Union and against firms which it considers to have an
"incorrect" attitude, the Soviet Government uses foreign trade as a positive aid to
fulfillment of its foreign policy objectives. For this purpose, it has used large-scale
loans, technical assistance, purchases of commodities which it does not need, cancella-
tion of contracts and of agreements, and embargoes.5 s
"' Pozdniakov, supra note 3, at 16-17.
57 Ibid.
"
8 The United States Department of State has reported that from 1955 through 1958, the communist
bloc had signed agreements with IS underdeveloped countries to provide approximately Si,6oo,ooo,ooo in
economic aid and $8oo,ooo,ooo in military aid. N.Y. Times, March 22, x959, p. I, col. 6. In January
x958, the State Department estimated that the Soviet Union had in recent years extended credits to
foreign countries in the amount of $i,9oo,ooo,ooo, at interest rates of 2 to 2Y2 %. id., Jan. 4, 1958, p. 4,
col. 2; Jan. 5, 1958, p. 15, col. I. In December 1958, a Hungarian publication stated that the Soviet
Union had extended credits amounting to $7,Ooo,ooo,ooo to East European countries, at 2% interest.
Id., Dec. 29, 1958, p. 4, col. 3. See generally JosEPH S. BERLINER, SovsaT EcoNoMIc AID (1958), MixE-
SELL & BEfItmAN, op. cit. supra note I.
Some specific examples of Soviet foreign trade transactions geared to Soviet political objectives are
the following:
In September-October 1951, when the foreign trade of Iran was almost at a standstill following the
nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian oil company, the Soviet Union made large-scale barter agreements
with Iran which enabled that country to obtain needed commodities which she could not procure in
the West. N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1951, p. 5, col. 3; id., Oct. 25, 1951, p. io, col. 6.
In x955, when Burma found itself in economic straits because of the Southeast Asian rice glut,
the Soviet Union arranged purchases of rice, as well as barters of rice for heavy equipment, technical aid,
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Apart from these more or less conventional weapons of economic warfare, the
Soviet state can use its monopoly of foreign trade to sell large quantities of goods at
low prices, thus disrupting world markets Recently, Soviet sales of aluminum and
tin and Rumanian sales of oil have raised fears that such a policy was being pur-
sued. On the whole, however, the Soviet Government has used this tactic very
sparingly and generally only where there has been some economic justification-the
desire to get rid of surpluses or to break into markets otherwise closed." It is reason-
able to suppose that the Soviet leaders recognize that, on the whole, a disruption of
world markets is not to their own interest, both because the Soviet economy depends
on such markets and because a deliberate policy of large-scale dumping would stimu-
late retaliatory measures on the part of other governments.
Finally, the Soviet state has the advantage of a unique type of influence on inter-
national trade-namely, that exercised by the communist parties of other countries.
In some cases, West European communist parties participate directly or indirectly
in private companies which import from, or export to, or finance trade with the
Soviet Union or other communist countries.
II
A.MERICAN CONTROLS ON TRAu WITH THE SOVIET UNION 60
Compared with domestic trade, American foreign trade is characterized by a
relatively high degree of governmental control; compared with the Soviet system
and cement, although the Soviet Union has little need for Burmese rice. Id., Nov. 28, 1955, p. i, col.
3.
In 1955, when the world market for cotton had reached extremely low levels because of over-
production, the Soviet Union was able to relieve Egypt of surplus cotton stocks by extending credits and
by a straight cotton-for-arms barter arrangement, although the Soviet Union was by then itself an
exporter of cotton. In x955, 26%, of Egyptian exports went to East Europe and Communist China,
as against 14% in 1954. Id., Aug. 27, 1956, P. 3, col. I.. When Egypt was threatened with economic
boycott and other sanctions following the Suez Canal nationalization in 1956, the Soviet Union, again,
responded with trade offers and the sending of technical personnel.
The most direct use of trade as d political weapon is the imposition of a total or partial embargo
purely as a retaliatory measure, with no relation to economic policy. The 1948 Yugoslav break with
the Cominform was punished by a total trade embargo on the part of the other members of the
Cominform. The impact of this action may be gauged by the fact that 50.7% of Yugoslavia's exports,
and 95.6% of its imports, came from East Europe in that part of 1948 which preceded the break.
Id., Dec. 28, 1948, p. 1, col. 7. In September 1955, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union signed a new
barter pact calling for exchanges of $70,000,000 a year, id., Sept. 2, 1955, p. 2, col. 3, and the Soviet
Union forgave a $90,000,000 Yugoslav debt, as a token indemnity for the damage caused by the
embargo. Id., July 28, 1955, p. 6, col. 2.
Economic measures, again, reflected a political rapprochement when, in November 1956, the Soviet
Union settled accounts with Poland. Polish debts arising out of the use of credits granted by the Soviet
Union, in full payment for coal delivered by Poland in 1946-53, were substantially reduced. Accounts
in connection with railroad transport and various noncommercial payments were also revised in Poland's
favor. See id., Nov. 19, 1956, p. r, col. 8.
For another example of withdrawal of trade for political reasons, denial of licenses for shipment
of oil to Israel as an aftermath of the Israeli attack on Egypt in the fall of r956, see supra note 34.
"' In the case of aluminum and tin, Soviet policy seems to have been influenced in part by an acute
balance-of-payments problem with the sterling area. C). Nove, Soviet Trade and Soviet Aid, Lloyd's Bank
Review, Jan. 1959, p. i. In addition, the Soviet leaders may have been seeking to exert pressure for
Soviet.admission to the Intergovernmental Tin Agreement.
" United States export controls were analyzed shortly after passage of the 1949 Export Control Act
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of foreign trade; however, the predominant characteristics of American -trade are that
it is carried on primarily by individual business firms, for .profit, on the basis. of
market conditions, with .prices and other -contract terms in large part (though not
entirely) free fr6m control either by. government or by cartels'or trade associations.
:it is its predominantly private, or market, character which determines not only the
basic institutional structure of American foreign .trade, but also, to a large extent,
the nature of the governmental controls upon it as well.
The legal controls imposed by the United States Government on trade with
communist countries6 ' have been grafted onto legal controls imposed on foreign
trade in general. The specifically anticommunist trade controls date only from
r948-4.'2 Like the'rest of American foreign trade controls, they do not present a
harmonious, preconceived, and systematic set of directives; but are a 'm6lange of par-
ticular measures designed to meet particular objectives and, sometimes, to satisfy
particular interest groups. We shall consider them under the following headings:
import controls, export controls, credit and exchange controls, restrictions on access
to markets, and use of foreign trade to achieve political objectives.
A- Import Controls
i. Customs duties
The chief form of American import control is the tariff. Since 1934, and especially
since 1947, successive reductions in customs duties effected by the President under
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Acts and through the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade have made the American tariff a much less formidable barrier
to foreign trade than it was in the 192o's and early I93O's.
In. the case of imports from communist countries, however, Congress, in i95i,
as a result primarily of the Korean War, required the President to suspend, with-
draw, or prevent the application of all tariff concessions granted since i93o to the
Soviet Union and to "any nation or area dominated or controlled by the foreign
government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement."63
The re-imposition of the 193o tariffs upon imports from communist countries
in a student comment, Export "Controlr, 58 YALE L. J. 1292 (1949), and in a short article by Ostroff,
The Control of Exports, 13 FED. B. J. 52 (1952). See also Silverstone, The Export Control Act of
.949: Extra-territorial Enforcement, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 331 (1959). "A valuable essay on the wartime
and immediate postwar system of export licensing, is ROBERT C. TURNER, EXPORT CONTROL IN THE
UNITED STATES DURING THE WAR AND PosTwAt PERIODS (1947). Apart from these items, there has been
"no analysis of the structure of American export controls in legal or economic periodicals, so far as the
*writer can discover, and- there are no books on the subj&t. Export controls are described in quarterly
reports on export control issued by the Secretary of Commerce to -the President, the Senate, and the
House of Representatives and in the Battle Act reports issued by the International -Cooperation Admin-
istration and its predecessors. The import and transactions controls on trade with communist countries
seem to be analyzed nowhere. Indeed, government controls on foreign trade in general are, relative
to their importance, one of the least studied branches of American law.
I .•'On the use of the term "communist," see supra note 2. American restrictions on trade with coM-
.munist countries, do not extend to Yugoslavia.
" See infra note 87.
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, § 5, 65 STAT. 73, 19 U.S.C. S 1362 ([952).
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except Yugoslavia involved the termination or modification of various commercial
treaties and agreements' In the case of the Soviet Union in particular, the Presi-
dent gave notice to the Soviet Government of termination of the Executive Agree-
ment of 1937 in which the United States had granted to the Soviet Union un-
conditional and unrestricted most-favored-nation treatment with respect to customs
duties, customs formalities, and laws affecting sale or use of imported goods within
the country.5
As a result of the withdrawal of tariff concessions, Soviet manganese ore im-
ported into the United States is taxed at the 193o rate of one cent per pound on
the metallic manganese therein, whereas manganese ore from noncommunist coun-
tries is taxed at the rate of one-fourth cent per pound on the metallic manganese
therein. Hewn or sawed timber imported from the Soviet Union is taxed at the
i93o rate of one dollar per thousand board feet, whereas the same product imported
from noncommunist countries is dutiable at twenty-five cents per thousand board
feet. Essential or distilled oils imported from the Soviet Union are subject to a
customs duty of twenty-five per cent ad valorem, whereas the customs duty on the
same product imported from noncommunist countries is 6 per cent ad valoremp0
These and other similar differences in tariff rates have been an important contrib-
uting cause of the decline of imports from the Soviet Union, although it should
be noted that imports of Soviet products which are duty-free have also declined.
07
American imports from the Soviet Union, in addition to being subject to the i93o
tariff rate, are exposed to several other tariff hazards which, though not erected
expressly against communist countries, are apt to hit them with special force. These
include antidumping duties, countervailing duties, and equalization duties. The
", Notice was given of termination of the 1937 commercial agreement with the Soviet Government,
see infra note 65, and of the provisional commercial agreement of 1930 with Rumania, and the
provisional commercial agreement with Bulgaria of 1932 was denounced. Because most-favored-nation
provisions were parts of treaties of friendship, commerce, and consular rights with Hungary and
Poland, these states were notified to modify the treaties in question by terminating the relevant most-
favored-nation articles or to terminate the treaties as a whole. Because Czechoslovakia was a contracting
party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, it was necessary to obtain a waiver of United
States obligations to that country from the other contracting parties. See 13 RAYMOND DENNETr &
KATHERINE D. DtANT (Ens.), DoCUMENTs ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, JANUARY x-DEcEMOER 35,
1951, at 3x6 (1952). By presidential proclamation, tariff concessions were suspended, "until reinstated,"
on imports from Albania, Estonia, the Kurile Islands, Latvia, Lithuania, Outer Mongolia, Rumania, the
Russian Zone of Germany and the Russian Sector of Berlin, Southern Sakhalin, Tanna Tuva, and com-
munist-controlled parts of China, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Korea. 16 Fan. REo. 7635, 7636
('95').
"The executive agreement extending most-favored-nation treatment to the Soviet Union, in return
for Soviet commitments to purchase at least $40,000,000 of American goods, was concluded on August
4, 1937, 50 STAT. x619, E.A.S. No. ios; and subsequently extended, for one-year periods, in 1938,
53 STAT. 1947, E.A.S. No. 132; in 1939, 53 STAT. 2404, E.A.S. No. 151; in 1940, 54 STAT. 2366,
E.A.S. No. 179; in 1941, 55 STAT. 1316, E.A.S. No. 215; and in 1942, 56 STAT. 1s00, E.A.S. No, 253.
There are, at present, no commercial agreements in force with the Soviet Union, except lend-lease.
U. S. DEp'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1958, at 157-59 (1958).
"'The 193o rates are ound in the Tariff Act of 1930, 46 STAT. 590, 19 U.S.C. S xoo, paras. 302, 58,
401. Information as to current rates was received from the Entry Division of the United States Customs
House, Boston, Mass.
'T See infra note 82.
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American antidumping acts resulted from fears of West European dumping; they
have been applied relatively rarely,"s and in no case to imports from a communist
country. However, the basic test of the act-namely, that dumping occurs if the
goods are imported into the United States at less than the price for which they are
sold in the country of manufacture-threatens countries which do not have a free
price system and a convertible currency; and the provision that in the absence of a
foreign or export price, the value of the goods may be determined on the basis of cost
of production is susceptible of arbitrary application in the case of imports from a
planned economy.69
Countervailing duties are a surtax, in addition to normal customs duties, imposed
on imports whose exportation has been facilitated through a subsidy of the govern-
ment of the foreign country. The additional duty is designed to neutralize the
foreign subsidy.7 ° Again, although in practice countervailing duties have not been
levied upon imports from communist countries, they constitute a potential threat
to trade with countries whose entire economy is, in one sense, subsidized.
Another type of tariff restriction which threatens the Soviet Union and other
communist countries, for reasons similar to those indicated in the preceding para-
graphs regarding antidumping and countervailing duties, is the provision of the
193o Tariff Act that imports produced in countries with costs of production lower
than those prevailing in the United States are to be taxed so as to "equalize" the
costs of production in the two countries. 7' This provision does not apply to goods
imported from countries with which the United States has a reciprocal trade agree-
" According to the Bureau of Customs of the Treasury Department, antidumping duties have been
imposed only twice in the postwar period-on certain hardboard from Sweden, and on iron pipe from
the United Kingdom.
" Antidumping Act, 42 STAT. 110 (1921), as amended, x9 U.S.C. §§ 16o-73 (1952). "Fair value"
is defined in terms of a formula which compares the import price with the price at which the goods
are sold for home consumption or for export in their home market. If sales volume in the home market
does not form an adequate basis of comparison with sales in the United States, reference is made to third
country sales. If third country sales do not form an adequate basis of comparison, or if figures are
not available, cost of production is used. TREAs. REG. § 14.7 (Supp. 1956).
The difficulty of applying these standards to the Soviet economy is readily apparent. The official
Soviet rate of four rubles to the dollar is inflated for some purposes. Ten rubles for a dollar are given
to tourists and for "noncommercial transactions." Rubles are sold by private speculators in Western
cities at rates ranging around 30 rubles for a dollar; however, the ruble is an internal currency .only,
and thus the "free" rate in foreign markets is for rubles which cannot purchase goods outside the
Soviet Union and cannot legally be taken into the Soviet Union. Also domestic prices of many consumer
goods are highly inflated by a turnover tax imposed on the transfer from the producing organization.
In Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United States, T.D. 45535, 61 TREAs. DEc. 689 (1931), the court
held that matches imported from the U.S.S.R. could not be subject to an antidumping duty, in *part
because there was no foreign value for such matches in the Soviet Union and there was no evidence in
the record of the cost of production. This case is interpreted in HARRY C. HAwKINs, COMMERCIAL
TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS 137 (1951), as meaning that existing legislation is inadequate to prevent
Soviet dumping. It should not be impossible, however, to present some evidence of Soviet cost of
production; how to interpret the evidence is another matter.
" See Tariff Act of 1930, § 303, 46 STAT. 687, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (952).
71 46 STAT. 701, 19 U.S.C. § X336 (1952). The Tariff Commission is required to report to the
President findings with respect to differences in cost of production and to report such increases or
decreases in rates of duty, up to 5o%; as it finds necessary to equalize such differences. However, the
President has discretion with respect to approval of the Tariff Commission's recommendations.
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fldrt;'? biit' incd the-dei'uncfation of such agrie~rnentt;with the communist countri6s
(.iept Yiigoslavia)" in 195 i,,it hds presumably' revived as to them, though ,it has
Mi beer" 4plied f6"therm' yet.
2 .Quotos.,and prohibitions..
Quantitative restrictions upon- imports play. a relatively small. role. in American
foreign trade: Nevertheless, there are a few types'of quota restrictions and prohibited
imports which are an 'obstacle to trade with the Soviet Union, and other communist
countries.
a. The President's power to impose restrictions -upon goods imported in such
q idhtities' as to constitute an actual -or potential, threat to the -national security
t lough not especially addressed to communist countries and thus far not exercised
dgainst them, are potentially applicable to all imports from them 7
b. United States Treasury Regulations issued- in December i95o, under the
Trading With the Enemy Act, prohibit the importation, without a license from
the- Secretary of the Treasury, of all merchandise the country of origin of which is
Communist China or North Korea, and also of certain specified goods of which
fthse countries are principal suppliers, from any country not named in the act 4
Thus, cashmere may be imported from Iran freely, but not from any other country
ofi the world without a license. Weasel may be imported from Canada, but not
from any other country without a license. In fact, the Secretary of the Treasury does
i'ssue licenses for imports of the listed merchandise, and in the case of communist
countries other than Communist' China and North Korea, an informal quota system
h'asben'establishedj 5
'":'Se '48 SrAT. 944, 19 U.S.C. S 1352 (1952). In addition to the provisions discussed above,
ill6"Prfdint is" authorized to impose additional duties on imports from a foreign country which dis-
criminaiei, in fact, directly 0r indirectly, by a law or administrative regulation or practice, against the
'6xport aiid commerce 6f the United States, which is not equally enforced upon the like articles of every
foreign country, or which places the commerce of the United States at a disadvantage compared with
.the commerce of any foreign country. 46 STAT. 704,' 19 U.S.C. § 1338 (1952). If, after the proclama-
tion f' uch duties, the discriminating country maintains or increases its discriminations, the President
is ' iioriied, if he' deems i't' consistent with the interests of the United States, to exclude products
6rita cbtrntry from 'importation into the Uiited States. The additional duties are not to exceed 5o%
ad,"Waloiem or its equivalent. This provision has apparently never been applied.
1 'Tide Agreements Extension'Act of'x955, § 7b, 69 STAT. 166, i9 U.S.C. § 1352a (Supp. V, 1958).
Cj,'Fr.iefmaini, Rights" of lmprterj under Section 7b of theTrade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, 25
'GEo. WAt ; L. REv. 427 (957): Theprdviiion'was retained in the Trade Agreements Extension Act of
i '§'8, 72 STAT. 678, ig U.S'(4A. § i'32a (S'upp. xs5 Y.""
" Trading With the Enemy Act of I9M7, 40 STAT. '14, 5O U.S.C. App. §§ 1-40 (952), as amended,
3Z .. R. 9 500.o4' (Szpp. I957). Following is a paihtial listifig of the'42 items included in the regula-
tion: aniseed, bambo, hog bristlei, paint brushes, carket' wdol, cassia,'cinnamon oil, eggs, feathers and
.6Ai fifcrackers, floor coveriifi'g'o dt'skins, 'ginger fi6tW, hats, jade stones, menthol, musk, tussah silk,
theisge 'tea, tuna oil, walsuts," and'-ik haii.
' Imports of the listed products from noicminmfinist-countrics rquir, a certificate of origin verified
by the exporter's government. I I i952, the Division 'of Fnreign Assets Control of the' Treasury Depart-
'ent estblisbed a quoia system for traditional importets' of certain goods from commduiist countries,
nxcet' bhina arid'i Korea. Each imrporter' w'as"' giWrl 'a' qtlot& based' on the share of the total
imiportaiion volume which his past ii'port buiineis reflecte& in tlhe base period 1946-'5o. -DiVision
6ficials state that this system was devised because 'it- Was :corsidered 'that, although ai-certificate' of
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c. One peculiar restrictiona directed against the Soviet.'Union and Communist
China was the prohibition in i951 of the importation. of seven kinds of furs and
skins, but not of others, which are the product- of these two.countries70 This in-
sertion into the Trade Agreements Extensidn Act of 195i, which. has, been carried
over into subsequent renewals of the'Adt, wds the result of 'influience upon. Congress
by businessmen interested in selective prohibiiodi, of competing imports, who were
able to take' advantage of popular anticommuhist- feeling- generated by the Korean
War. This is the only example of an absolute import piohibition, of particular
Soviet products under American law.
d. Another type of import prohibition which was designed to affect the Soviet
Union, as well as Other countries, is the provision of the 193& Taiiff Act barring im-
ports produced by convicts or forced laborYt "This provision has occasionally- been
applied in practice 78  It was applied in 1951 to Soviet crabmeat,70 and its existence
constitutes a barrier to imports of other Soviet products, such as timber, which is
produced in part by prisoners in the Siberian corrective labor camps.
Although the United States imposes quotas on the import of a few agricultural
products (chiefly, cotton, sugar, wheat, butter, and some other dairy products) and
also of lead, zinc, and petroleum, these controls ate not directed against particular
countries and do not affect the Soviet Union or other communist countries sub-
stantially.
3. Restrictions upon governmental purchases of foreign goods.
In 1933, Congress enacted the "Buy American" Act, which requires United States
government agencies and business firms under contract with such agencies, in
making purchases of goods for public use within the United States, to acquire "only
such unmanufactured articles as have been produced substantially all from material
produced in the United States," unless to do so would be "(a) inconsistent with the
public interest or (b) unreasonably costly." -This law was implemented in 1954
origin procedure would not be practicable with communist countries, established 'importers of these
products should not be put out of business. No regulation has been published to this effect.
7 Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, § II, 65 STAT. 75, 19 U.S.C. § 1367 (1952): "The
President shall ...take such measures as may be necessary to prevent the importation of ermine, fox,
kolinsky, marten, mink, muskrat and weasel furs and skins . . . which are the product of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics or of Communist China." The President subsequently proclaimed that such
imports are prohibited. x6 FED. REG. 7635, 7636 (xg5i). .
" "All goods . . . produced .. . in any foreign country by convict labor or/and forced labor or/and
indentured labor under penal sanctions shall not be entitled to entry at any: of the ports of the United
States, and the importation .thereof is hereby prohibited....
,"'Forced labor,' as herein used, shall mean all work or service which i ,exacted from any. person
under the menace of 4ny penalty for its nonperformance and for which the worker does not offer
-himself voluntarily." 46 STAT. 689, i9 "U.S.C. § 1307 (1952).. -
.8 Recently, certain, products made. by prisoners in Mexican jails have been excluded, according to an
official. of the Bureau- of Customs. Once a. finding is made that the product is produced by convict
or forced labor, it is excluded until satisfactory proof to the contrary is offered.
70 19 C.F.R. § 12.42 (i953); x6 FED. REG. 776 (195)..
"s "Buy American" Act § 2, 47 STAT. 1520 (1933), 41 U.S.C. § oa (1952).
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by an executive order which stated certain price criteria for determining whether
to purchase the product in the United States would be inconsistent with the public
interest or unreasonably costly and which provided (section three): "Nothing in
this order shall affect the authority or responsibility of an executive agency: (a) To
reject any bid or offer for materials of foreign origin if such rejection is necessary
to protect national security interests, after receiving advice with respect thereto from
the President or from any officer of the Government designated by the President
to furnish such advice. '81
Thus, the present effect of the "Buy American" Act is to prevent imports under
government contracts from any foreign country where such import would be against
"the public interest, .... the national interest," or "essential national security interests."
The law could easily be interpreted as permitting a government agency to reject any
bid or offer of products of the Soviet Union or any other communist country.
Apart from the above-mentioned controls, there is no restriction upon any import
from the Soviet Union into the United States. The only restrictions which have
actually been invoked are the imposition of quotas on forty-two products listed in
the Treasury Regulations under the Trading With the Enemy Act as subject to
licensing, the prohibition upon imports of seven kinds of furs and skins listed in the
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 195i, and the exclusion of crabmeat as the
product of forced labor. On the other hand, the withdrawal of tariff concessions
from the communist countries (except Yugoslavia) is a serious barrier to the im-
portation of many-though by no means all-of their products; 2 and the power of
the President to restrict imports when the national security so requires and the
provisions for levying antidumping and countervailing duties, for "equalizing" the
cost of production, and for barring products of convict or slave labor are a serious
threat to imports from communist countries, though they have rarely been applied
in practice, partly because of the small volume of such imports. Recent imports
of Soviet benzene, Rumanian oil, and other products from the Soviet Union and
East Europe have raised cries for invoking all these restrictions.8 3
s8 Exec. Order No. io582, 29 FED. REG. 8723 (1954).
82 The level of general imports from the U.S.S.R. dropped from $86,825,000 in 1948 to $16,818,ooo in
1952. Nevertheless, imports of some commodities actually increased during the period 1948-52. Bristles
imports rose from $210,000 in 1948 to $8i8,ooo in 1952. Imports of certain commodities principally
manufactured by other European communist countries rose as well. $6,000 worth of meats and sausage
casings, mostly from Poland, were imported in 1948; by 1952, these imports had reached the figure
of $7,259,ooo. There was likewise an increase in the importation of fertilizers and fertilizer materials,
from $Si8,ooo in 1948 to $2,746,ooo by 1952. On the other hand, there were no imports of asbestos,
which is on the free list and which was imported from the Soviet Union before the war (6,ooo tons in
1936, according to BAYKoV, op. cit. supra note I, at 97). See 9 MUTuAL DEFENSE AssusTANcE CONTROL
REPORT [hereinafter cited as NINTH BATTLE ACT REPORT] app. E, table 4C (x957). In 1956, imports
from the U.S.S.R. amounted to $24,443,000; and in 1957, to $16,5r2,000. United States imports from
the Sino-Soviet bloc totaled approximately $66,ooo,ooo in 1957, as compared with approximately
$73,000,000 in 2956, approximately $46,000,000 in 1953, and approximately $233,000,ooo in 2948. it
MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE CONTROL REPORT table 5a (1958).
"' Cf. N.Y. Times, March 2, 959, p. i, col. 4.
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B. Export Controls
i. Controls upon exports of strategic goods
It is characteristic of the differences between the Soviet and the American systems
of foreign trade that the Soviet Government may prevent exportation of any particu-
lar product to any particular country without enacting any prohibitory legislation or
regulations, by the mere omission of the planning and administrative authorities to
provide for exportation of the particular product to the particular country; whereas
the American Government may not prevent private exportation of any particular
product to any particular country without some prohibitory legislation or regulations.
The elaborateness of such prohibitory legislation and regulations is, in part, an index
of the extensiveness of the prohibitions, but it is also, in part, an index of the extent to
which foreign trade operations are in private rather than governmental hands.
Export controls were imposed by the United States Government for the first time
in 1940, when the President was authorized to prohibit or curtail export of military
equipment or munitions in the interest of national defensef 4 In 1942, the list was
extended to include all commodities and technical data, regardless of its significance
for national defense s8 Although Congress removed many of the wartime powers
of the executive in 1947, the power to control exports was retained, though with
some limitations and with the congressional injunction that it should be used
sparingly." In 1949, the present United States Export Control Act was passed,
authorizing the President to "prohibit or curtail the exportation from the United
States . . . of any articles, materials, or supplies, including technical data, except
under such rules and regulations as he shall prescribe '8 7 Under the rules and
regulations laid down by the President, all exports, except those to Canada or a
United States territory, require some form of license; however, most shipments
can be made under a general license-that is, without obtaining specific prior per-
mission. A shipment requiring a validated license can be made only after specific
permission is obtained from United States Bureau of Foreign Commerce of the
Department of Commerce, through its Office of Export Supply, a section established
to administer export controls. Whether a general license or a validated license is
required, however, the exporter must file a Shipper's Export Declaration describing
the commodity to be exported and the name of the person to whom the commodity
a& 54 STAT. 712, 714 (1940), 50 U.S.C. App. § 1171 (1952).
85 56 STAT. 463 (1942), 50 U.S.C. App. § 793 (1952)-
88 Second Decontrol Act of 1947, 6x STAT. 321, 50 U.S.C. App. § 645 (952). Staffs of the Senate
Foreign Relations Comm. and the House Foreign Affairs Comm., The European Recovery Program-
Basic Documents and Background Information, S. RPp. No. xii, 8oth Cong. xst Sess. 181 (1947) de-
clares that "pursuant to the clearly expressed will of the Congress, the executive branch has used
sparingly the controls which were left on the statute books."
'Export Control Act of 5949, § 3, c. 11, 63 STAT. 7, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2021-32 (952). Under the
Second Decontrol Act, supra note 86, shipments of all commodities to Europe and neighboring regions
were brought under control as of March 1, 1948. On April 30, 1948, the Secretary of Commerce re-
ported that "primary attention has been devoted to shipments to Eastern rather than Western Europe,"
and that "all license applications to this area are subjected to close scrutiny." U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Export Control and Allocation Powers, April 30, 1948, p. 1S.
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is ultimately consigned, as well asof-any intermediate consignee. Where a validated
license is required, the application must state the .cuntry'.of ultimate destination,
the ultimate.consignee in the foreign country,. and the end use of the product (for
purchaser's own .use, for resale in the open.market, for new construction, for main-
tenance ofexisting facilities, for re-export, ,and .if so, to what country, etc.), as well
.as .other information, including "a detailed .description of the specific use of the
proposed exportation and its ultimate significance in the economy of the country of
Aestination.".. Moreover, the. applicant for a validated license must submit a state-
ment from the ultimate consignee describing in detail the end use to which the
commodity will be put, the types of customers, to whom the resale will be made if
resale is contemplated, etc. .
For licensing purposes the world is divided. into two parts, Country Groups 0
and R. Country Group 0 consists of all of the Western Hemisphere nations, ex-
.cept Canada. Country Group R consists of all other countries in the world, except
Canada. Subgroup A within Country Group R consists of nations with communist
governments-specifically, Albania, Bulgaria, Communist China, Communist-con-
trolled parts of Vietnam and Laos, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Estonia, Hungary,
.Latvia, Lithuania, North Korea, Outer Mongolia, Rumania and the Soviet Union
-but not Yugoslavia or, since 1957, Poland.8 9
Commodities subject to export control because they are in short supply (in Janu-
ary 1959, nickel alone fell into that category) or because they are considered strategic
are placed on the so-called "Positive List." Certain, goods on the Positive List-classi-
fied as R commodities-require a validated license if exported to R countries; other
.goods, on the Positive List--classified as RO commodities-require a validated license
if exported to either R or 0 countries. Until recently, all commodities exported
to Subgroup A destinations, as well as to Hong Kong and Macao, required a vali-
-dated license, whether or not they appeared on the Positive List;"0 in April 1956, a
specific list of peaceful goods for export to European Russia (but not the Maritime
Provinces-i.e. the Far Eastern seaports--of the Soviet Union) and East Europe was
made subject to a general license, called General License Subgroup A, (GLSA) Y1
as The statement from the ultimate consignee, may be by wire or cable. It must include ultimate
,destination, end use, and a description of the transaction sufficient to identify it as the same described
in the application. If any changes are to be made, the consignee must promptly send a supplemental
.statement. There is, however, an alternative procedure, for exporters who have a continuing- and
regular relationship with an ultimate consignee involving 'recurring orders for the same kind of' om-
mnodities to the- same -destinations- and for the same end uses. The exporter may submit a single
-statement signed. by the ultimate consignee covering all proposed shipments for the year. x5 C.F.R.
j 372.4 0957).
8o 15 C.F.R." §-371.3(a)(2). (i957), as amended, 22 FED REG. 7556 (1957).
"Ild. § 371.2(c)(I)(ii). See also id. § 372.3.
"Id- § 371.24. ,See U.S. Dep't Commerce; Export Control, 4th quarter r957, p. 15 for the list of
'.commodities subject to-the general license GLSA. See also x5 C.F.R. § 371.51- (Supp, 1959). Another
list' is applicable for. exports tb Hong Kong (GHK); this list was extended to Macao on May 29, 1958.
"The establishment of this new general license in no way reflected a change in policy ,with respect to
.exports of itrategic gbods 'to the Soviet bloc- Validated. licenses for European Soviet bloc, destinations
]have continued to be required for all commodities not specifically includedon the'GLSA roster. The
SOVIET-AmERCAN TRADE
. One of the chief practical difficulties for American manufacturer-exporters who
wish to sell to the Soviet Union plant and machinery which is neither on the
Positive List nor subject to general license GLSA is that they cannot be given advance
assurance of a validated license; that is, the regulations of the Bureau of Foreign
Commerce require that license applications be supported by a firm order. Since
a considerable amount of time and money is often required even to do the prelim-
inary work necessary to put in a bid, the license risk becomes a substantial obstacle?'
The Bureau of Foreign Commerce has virtually complete discretion in deciding
whether or not to grant a validated license, within the general purposes of the Act. 3
A system of administrative appeals from denial of a license is provided, with the
final authority in a three-man Appeals Board designated within the Department of
Commerce, but the discretion of the licensing authorities is so broad that it is hard
to think of any ground on which their decision could be reversed, except refusal
main purpose of GLSA was to facilitate trade with the European Soviet bloc in nonstrategic and non-
Positive List commodities by eliminating the burden on the American export community of receiving prior
Government approval. All of the goods included on the GLSA roster are of the type that would be
approved to these destinations under existing export licensing policy. [Query: would they have been
under pre-existing policy?-H.J.B.]
"Approximately 700 items in over 57 general commodity categories were included on the initial GLSA
roster, including: beverages, certain rubber products, drugs and pharmaceuticals, fibers, wood and
paper products, glass, clay products, cutlery, household goods, refrigeration equipment, office machines,
dyes, leather, hides and skins, pigments, paints, certain, chemical specialty, items, soil improvement
compounds, soap and toiletries, photographic equipment, certain optical goods, musical instruments, toys,
dental equipment, jewelry, lamps, sponges, notions, beauty and barber supplies and coin-operated
machines.
"On June 2o, 1957, the Department announced an expansion of GLSA to include approximately 250
additional nonstrategic commodities.
"In another action, effective June 27, 1957, the Department removed a small number "of items from
the GLSA roster in order to prevent possible circumvention of U.S. Government policy providing for the
denial of exports of subsidized Commodity Credit Corporation goods to the U.S.S.R. and other Eastern
European countries (other than Poland). Commodities removed frm the GLSA roster under this action
included rubber and rubberized piece goods, fabrics, clothing, shoes and miscellaneous cotton textile
products." U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Export Control, 4 th quarter 1957, PP. 15, 16. (It is the policy
of the Bureau of Foreign Commerce to deny applications for validated licensees to export, or authority
to re-export, agricultural commodities and manufactures thereof to Subgroup A countries where the
commodity is acquired directly or indirectly from the Commodity Credit Corporation or is shipped in
substitution for such a commodity or is subsidized for export.)
In 1958, more goods were added to GLSA; and in, 1959,.some goods have been subtracted from it.
Most of the industrial equipment which the Soviet Union has sought to buy in the United States in
recent years is neither on the GLSA list nor on-the Positive List, and hence requires validated licenses.
See infra note 135.
A hitch to GLSA procedure is that the exporter must acquire a validated license for the export of
any related technical data, aside from purely scientific material, that is not generally available.
02 Cf. Address by Frank W. Sheaffer, Acting Director, Export Supply, U.S. Bureau of Foreign
Commerce, at the Meeting of the American Management Association, Inc., New York City, Nov. 6, g58.
"The general purposes are: "(a) to protect the domestic economy from the excessive drain of
scarce materials and to reduce the inflationary impact of abnormal foreign demand; (b) to further the
foreign policy of the United States and to aid in fulfilling its international responsibilities; and (c)
to exercise the necessary vigilance over exports from the standpoint of their significance to the national
security." 63 STAT. 7 (1949), 50 U.S.C. App. § 2022 (x952). See also 15 C.F.R. §§ 372.!, 372.5
(1957): Since the Korean War, commodities controlled due to short supply have diminished almost
entirely, and in January 1959, consisted solely of various types of nickel. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Export Control, 4 th quarter x958, p. 16.
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to follow procedural requirements or a clear mistake in the findings of fact. 4 No
applicant has ever taken the denial or revocation of a license to court.
2. Intergovernmental coordination of controls on trade with communist countries
One of the legal problems involved in the rigorous system of United States export
controls is the question of their extraterritorial effect. They subject to the penalties
of the criminal law of the United States-with fines up to $io,ooo and imprisonment
up to one year-any person who violates them, including any carrier or any con-
signee who diverts cargo contrary to the provisions of the export licenseY5 In fact,
however, transshipment in violation of the United States Export Control Act by
persons not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States cannot effectively be
dealt with by criminal sanctions. Administrative denial of export privileges to such
persons is a more effective means of enforcement, and hundreds of American and
foreign merchants have suffered this penalty. 8  In addition, the cooperation of
foreign governments has been enlisted. Under a procedure introduced in 1952 for
specific Positive List commodities exported to West European countries, the applicant
for an export license must submit an import certificate (IC) issued by the govern-
ment of the importing country; thus, the importer must make an official commitment
to his government, under sanctions of penalties imposed by it, that the goods will
not be used or re-exported or transshipped contrary to its regulations. Secondly, the
United States authorities may, at their option, require a delivery verification (DV)
in any case in which an import certificate is required and in certain other cases.
The exporter obtains the verification from the importer, who receives it from his
government. The importing country thus cooperates in the discovery of illegal
transshipments. The procedure is referred to as IC/DV procedurey7 It should be
noted, however, that IC/DV procedure is not applicable to goods which are not
on the Positive List, but which require validated United States licenses.
A second problem, perhaps more political than legal, which is involved in the
system of United States controls of exports of strategic goods is the question of
the extent to which the United States may properly exert influence on other coun-
tries to maintain similar controls and to coordinate their controls with the American.
The system of coordination of controls was established by the Mutual Defense
Assistance Control Act (or Battle Act) of 1951, under which a coordinating commit-
"The regulations state that any person may appeal on the following grounds: "(,) The regulation
or administrative action works an exceptional and unreasonable hardship upon him; or (2) The regula-
tion or administrative action improperly discriminates against him." x5 C.F.R. § 383.1(c) (x957).
9' 15 C.F.R. § 381 (x957); 63 STAT. 8 (1949), 50 U.S.C. App. § 2025 (1952). The Act does not
distinguish between American and foreign violators of its provisions.
" "The Export Control Investigation Staff of the Department of Commerce may initiate such pro-
ceedings against any person who appears to have violated any regulation related to export control.
Hearings take place before Compliance Commissioners appointed by the Director of the Bureau of
Foreign Commerce of the Department of Commerce. Complaints regarding administrative actions, or
concerning regulations issued under the Export Control Act, may be brought before the Commerce Depart-
ment's Appeals Board for final determination." U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Export Control, 3d quarter
1958, p. x8. See x5 C.F.R. § 382.1 (1957). Cf. Silverstone, supra note 6o, at 338 et Seq.
"IC/DV procedures are outlined in 15 C.F.R. §§ 368, 373.2 (x957).
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tee of representatives of various countries is appointed to determine what goods should
be considered strategic and what means should be adopted to prevent them from
reaching communist countriesY' In fact, the system of controls of strategic exports
is virtually the same in most West European countries. ° However, there is some-
times considerable diversity of opinion as to what exports should be restricted and
what should not. Under the Battle Act, the President is authorized to withhold all
economic assistance from any country which permits an export to any communist
country of any goods "of primary strategic significance."'' 0 Although a fairly high
degree of harmony has apparently been maintained between the United States, Can-
ada, and West Europe with respect to the Positive List of goods not to be exported
to East European countries, there is a wide disparity concerning goods not on the
Positive List, but, nevertheless, requiring validated licenses under American law.' 0 '
Moreover, the insistence of the United States on more severe restrictions in the case
of Communist China has been rejected.1'0 2
" Multilateral organizations for international export controls have been functioning in Paris since
January i95o. International lists of items for embargo, for quotas, and for surveillance have been
established, although each participating country has its own national control list. The administrative
machinery consists of the Consultative Group, which sits at intervals to coordinate strategic trade con-
trols policy, and two subordinate committees which oversee continuing enforcement. One is the Co-
ordinating Committee (COCOM); the other is the China Committee, (CHINCOM), established in
1952. COCOM applies trade controls to European communist countries; CHINCOM administers the
more stringent controls on trade with communist countries in the Far East. In 1956, the following
countries were members of the Consultative Group: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of
Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Netherlands, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States. See NiNTH BATTLE AcT REPORT 15-2o.
"D Almost all the participating countries maintain the following trade-controls methods: a system of
export licenses, which frequently includes end-use checks and IC/DV procedures; financial controls
which require a check by officials on receipts and expenditures of foreign exchange; transit controls
requiring permits and licenses for re-export, as well as checks on ultimate destination; and shipping
controls aimed at preventing the carriage of strategic goods to Communist China, North Korea, or North
Vietnam, as well as the denial of bunkering facilities to vessels engaged in such carriage. See NINTH
BATTLE Acr REPORT app. C.
... Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of i95i, § xo1(b), 65 STAT. 644, 22 U.S.C. § 16isa
(1952). Thus far, aid has never been withheld, although official portests have occasionally been made.
"On February 24 Anc. Etabl. Hofman, an import-export firm of Ghent, Belgium, and its owner,
Andre Gryp, were barred from all U.S. export privileges for the duration of U.S. export controls for
illegal diversion of U.S. boron products and paraffin wax valued at over $7o,ooo. Violations of U.S.
export control regulations were further aggravated by false statements made to U.S. Government officials
investigating the diversions. The firm's defense that it did not violate Belgian laws in transshipping
the materials was rejected on the grounds that the recipients of U.S. goods who are informed of U.S.
restrictions on their dispositions are bound by such restrictions." U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Export
Control, ist quarter x958, p. i9. (Emphasis added.)
" Following the Korean armistice of July 27, 1953, CHINCOM members other than the United
States expressed concern over the wide divergence between the China and East European control lists.
These members have subsequently made extensive use of an exceptions procedure which has permitted them
to export goods to Communist China which do not appear on the strategic lists for Eastern Europe. The
items on which exceptions have been made include tractors, trucks, motor vehicles and parts, rubber,
low-grade iron, and steel products. See NttrTH BATTLE AcT REPORT 37-42.
Because of limitations of space, discussion of United States restrictions on exports to and imports
from Communist China and North Korea is confined to the present footnote. In March i95o, export
controls on shipments to Communist China were made coextensive with the existing controls applicable
to the European communist countries, according to id. at 32. Immediately following the invasion
of South Korea, the United States, in June 1950, invoked a total embargo on exports to North Korea.
15 FED. REo. 4189 (X950). On December 3, 1950, the United States imposed a complete embargo
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C. Credit and Exchange Controls
One of the more severe American restrictions upon trade with the Soviet Union
is the Johnson Act of 1934, as amended, which makes it a crime for any individual,
partnership, or private corporation or association to extend any loan to a foreign
government which is in default in the payment of its obligations to the United States
Government' The Act exempts public corporations created pursuant to special
congressional authorization and seems to exempt corporations in which the Govern-
ment of the United States exercises a controlling interest.0 4 The term "loan" in the
Johnson Act has been construed not to apply to normal commercial credits,'00 but it
is considered to apply to credits beyond six months.0 This limitation of six months
upon private credits is an obstacle to the supply of plant and equipment, where
on all exports to Communist China and Manchuria. 15 id. at 8563. The embargo has been rigorously
enforced and is still in effect. As a result of this embargo, there has been practically no United States
export trade with Communist China or North Korea since x951. (There were shipments to Communist
China of $6,ooo in 1954, which represented the value of automobiles for use of a diplomatic mission;
of $2,530 in 1955, which represented shipments of printed matter under a general export license; and
$12,073 in the first three quarters of 1957, which represented automobiles and parts for use of diplomatic
missions of friendly foreign governments. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Export Control, 3d quarter 1957, pp.
13-14.1
The prohibition of imports from Communist China and North Korea is effected by Treasury Regula-
tions of December 17, 1950, issued under Section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act, which
prohibits involvement in any financial or commercial transactions, by persons subject to United States
jurisdiction, that relate to the transfer of money, credit or goods to or from Communist China or North
Korea. 31 C.F.R. § 500.201, 500.204 (Supp. 1957). In fact, such transactions have been author-
ized only in the most exceptional cases.
Thus, in contrast with its approach to trade with the Soviet Union and East European communist
countries, the United States has sought a total embargo on trade with Communist China, rather than
selective controls on strategic items. This is undoubtedly connected with ideas of moral outlawry stem-
ming from the Korean conflict. An official report on the Battle Act states: "The reason for the United
States' prohibition against all exports to Communist China was not that every kind of merchandise was
considered to be directly helpful on the battlefield. Rather the prohibition was based on a deep-felt
conviction that-an aggressor nation, engaged in fighting and killing the troops of the United States and
other free countries, ought to be subjected to the maximum possible economic pressure, and that we
ought not to supply its economy with any articles whatever, even civilian-type articles." 3 MUTUAL
DaFENsE-AssISTANCE REPORT 34 (1953)-
For reasons not explained, the embargo does not extend to imports from Outer Mongolia (chiefly furs
and animal hairs), although it does extend to .exports to Outer Mongolia. Cf. U S. Dep't of Commerce,
Export Control, 4 th quarter 1957, P. 48.
'0' 62 STAT. 744 (948), 18 U.S.C: § 955 (1952). The penalties for violation are a fine of not more
than Sio,ooo or imprisonment for -not more than 5 years or both.
"0, Ibid. The language is somewhat obscure. The act applies to any "person," and "person" is said
to include any "individual partnership, corporation, or association other than a public corporation
created by or pursuant to special authorization of Congress, or a corporation in which the Government
of the United States has or exercises a controlling interest through stock ownership or otherwise." The
comma after the word "Congress," taken together with the absence of a comma after the word "associa-
tion," would suggest that a corporation in which the Government of the United States has a controlling
interest is contained within the definition of "person." However, the repetition of the word "or" sug-
gests that a corporation in which the Government has a controlling interest is excluded. In terms of
the purpose of the statute, it would seem that if public corporations created by Congress are excluded,
Government-controlled corporations would also be excluded. Special legislation was enacted to exempt
the Export-Import Bank from the Johnson Act. 59 STAT. 529 (1945), 12 U.S.C.A. § 635h (1952).
10538 Ops. ATty. GaN. 505 (1934).
100 This is the opinion of the Attorney General's office, as given informally in response to inquiries by
American businessmen. The point has never been tested in court, nor is it likely that any businessman
would deliberately take the risk of such a test.
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longer credits are not abnormal. The Soviet Government is considered to be. in
default on its obligations to the United States Government for debts of the Russian
Government incurred during World War I, for the value of relief supplies furnished
on credit under authority of the Act of February 25, i919, and for obligations in-
curred during World War II under the Lend-Lease Act. 0
7
Otherwise, there are no restrictions upon payments by American citizens to the
Soviet Union or other communist countries, except Communist China and North
Korea. There are, however, restrictions upon delivery of checks drawn on the
United States Treasury to payees within the territories of all communist countries,
except Yugoslavia and, since 1957, Poland.
In 1940, Congress provided that no checks drawn against United States funds
should be sent from the United States for delivery in a foreign country, where the
Secretary of the Treasury had determined that conditions in that country were
such that "there is not a reasonable assurance that the payee will actually receive
such check or warrant and be able to negotiate the same for full value."'0 s The act
does not affect checks in payment for salaries or wages, or goods purchased by the
United States Government.
The Secretary of the Treasury has determined that "postal, transportation, or
banking facilities in general or local conditions in Albania, Bulgaria, Communist-
controlled China, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Rumania, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Russian Zone of Occupation of Germany,
and the Russian Sector of Occupation of Berlin, Germany, are such that there is not
a reasonable assurance that a payee in those areas will actually receive checks or
warrants drawn against funds of the United States, or agencies or instrumentalities
thereof, and be able to negotiate the same for full value."'0 9 Checks drawn against
the United States Treasury are, therefore, not delivered to payees within these coun-
tries. The removal of Poland from this list in 1957 was not explained by the im-
provement in "postal transportation, or banking facilities in general or local condi-
tions" in that countryj"
There are no federal restrictions upon private inter vivos transfers of currency to
107 According to the Commissioner of Accounts of the Treasury Department, the June 30, 1958 in-
debtedness totals $573,270,081.23, which is made up of principal in the amount of S192,6oi,297.37 and
accrued interest in the amount of $380,668,783.86. The principal indebtedness consists of approximately
$187,700,000 cash advanced by the United States Treasury under the authority of the Liberty Bond Acts
of 1917, 40 STAT. 35, 288; approximately $400,000 value of surplus war goods sold on credit under
authority of the Act of July 9, 1918, 40 STAT. 844; and approximately $4,500,000 value of relief supplies
furnished under the Act of Feb. 25, 1919, 40 STAT. 1161. The statement that the Soviet Union is also
indebted to the United States under its lend-lease account has been made by the Office of the Legal
Adviser of the Department of State in response to inquiries concerning the applicability of the Johnson
Act to the Soviet Union.
los 54 STAT. zo86 (1940), 31 U.S.C. § 123 (952).
log3 C.F.R. § 211.3 (Supp. X957). The Soviet Zone of Occupation of Germany, the Soviet Sector
of Occupation of Berlin, Albania, and Bulgaria were added May 1o, X95o. 55 FaD. REG. 2938 (195o).
Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, and the Soviet Union were
added February 27, 1951. i6 FED. REG. 1818 (1951). The other countries were added April 25, 5951.
16 FED. REG. 3479-3480 (1951).
110 22 FED. REG. 4134 (1957)-
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any persons in any country except Communist China and North Korea."' Thus,
any private person in the United States may remit funds to any recipient in the Soviet
Union, in any amount, by a simple authorization to a private bank, and without
any possibility of governmental interference.
D. Restrictions upon Access of Soviet Trade Officials to
United States Markets
i. Exclusion of Soviet trade delegations
In connection with diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933, the
United States refused the Soviet request to appoint to the Soviet Embassy a trade
delegate with diplomatic status. It agreed only to the appointment of a Commercial
Attach6, with the understanding that such officer would not engage in commercial
transactions of any sort' The stated purpose of this restriction is to avoid problems
arising from the claim of sovereign immunity in connection with trade transac-
tions.
113
Soviet foreign trade combines may buy and sell in the United States through com-
mercial representatives. Also, there exists a New York corporation, the Amtorg
Trading Corporation, whose shares are held in escrow in Moscow, which buys and
sells in the United States as agent for Soviet foreign trade combines.
2. Registration as foreign agents
Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, no person may
act as an agent of a foreign government unless he has filed with the Attorney General
of the United States a statement of his relation to his foreign principal, the nature of
his business, his income and disbursements, and a detailed description of his
activities." 4 Under section 3(d) of the Act, persons engaging "only in private, non-
political, financial, mercantile or other activities in furtherance of the bona fide trade
or commerce of a foreign principal" are exempted from registration; however, the
172In most states, there are restrictions on testamentary transfers based on state statutes or state court
decisions authorizing probate courts to withhold funds in estates if they find that the beneficiaries will
not enjoy the benefit, use, or control of money remitted to them.. See, e.g., N.Y. SURR. CT. Act § 269;
N.J.. Rav. STAT. § 3 A: 25-io (1951); MAss. GEN. LAws C. 206, § 27A (1932); OHIo REV. CODE Ann.
§ 2107.52 (Page 1954); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29 4 6d (Supp. 1955); Mic. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (3o6a)
(Supp. 1955); OKA. STAT. tit. 6o, § 121 ('951); Cf. CAL. PROa. CODE §§ 259, 1O26. Under these
statutes, courts have often denied transfer of funds in estates to beneficiaries living in the Soviet Union
and other communist countries. See, e.g., Matter of Best, 200 Misc. 332, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 224 (Surr.
Ct. i951); In re Mazurowski, 331 Mass. 33, ix6 N.E.2d 854 (954). Cf. Heyman, The Non-Resident
Alien's Right to Succession under the Iron Curtain Rule, 52 Nw. U. L. REV. 221 (1957); Scheller &
Mayda, Payment of Estate Shares to Beneficiaries Behind the "Iron Curtain," Wis. Bar. Bull., June 1955,
p. 17; Chaitkin, The Rights of Residents of Russia and Its Satellites to Share in Estates ol American
Decedents, 25 So. CtA.IF. L. Rav. 297 (1952); Note, Beneficiaries Behind the Iron Curtain, 7 W. RM. L.
REV. 179 (1956).
... See.Memorandum by the Department of State to the Soviet Embassy, Dec. 20, 1933. U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS 0' THE UNITED STATES, THE SovIET UNION 1933-1939, at 5! (1952).
... During World War II, there was an official Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Wash-
ington which handled all orders for military and other goods shipped under the Lend-Lease Act. Dis-
putes arising from the Commission's activities were resolved through diplomatic channels.
"Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, § 2, 52 STAT. 632, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 612 (1952).
SOVIET-AMERICAN TRADE
Attorney General has a wide discretion to deny the exemption to persons who carry
on "any political activity," including lobbying, propaganda, collection of intelligence,
and similar activities." 5 Since 1949, Amtorg personnel have been required to register
and to report all their activities in detail.
3. Travel restrictions
On June 7, 1941, the United States imposed retaliatory travel restrictions on
Soviet officials, but these were withdrawn after the German attack on the Soviet
Union on June 22, I94I.16 In 1952, retaliatory travel restrictions were again imposed
on Soviet officials; m7 and in 1955, they were imposed on all resident Soviet citizens
who are in possession of valid passports issued by the Government of the Soviet
Union, other than United Nations employees." 8 Under the restrictions, Soviet citi-
zens are prohibited from travelling to certain cities and certain areas of the country-
chosen to correspond roughly to cities and areas of the Soviet Union to which Ameri-
can citizens are not allowed to go. However, the restrictions are not absolute; Soviet
citizens who are temporarily admitted to the United States for some specific purpose
"may be granted access to a closed city or area if their presence in such city or area
is germane to the purpose of the visit for which they were admitted.""' 9 Even for
resident representatives, a showing of adequate business reasons for presence in a
closed zone would probably result in a temporary accommodation.
4. Visa requirements
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 provides that aliens who are
members of a foreign Communist Party are ineligible to receive visas and are ex-
cluded from admission into the United States, but that this provision is inapplicable
"upon a basis of reciprocity, [to] officials and employees who have been accredited by
a foreign government recognized de jure by the United States, who are accepted by
the Secretary of State."'"2 In effect, this means that officials of foreign trade com-
bines or other economic organizations of communist countries (including Yugo-
slavia) would be eligible to receive visas only by permission of the Secretary of State.
Under the same Act, every alien who applied for a visa was required to be
registered and fingerprinted, except that the requirement could be waived, at the
discretion of the Secretary of State, for officials and employes of foreign govern-
ments.' 21 Representatives of trading organizations of the Soviet Union and other
countries of planned economy are "officials" within the meaning of the Act. In 1957,
the fingerprinting requirement was waived in the case of most nonimmigrant
aliens.' 2
2
... See 28 C.F.R. § 5.303 (1949). "Political activity" is defined in 28 C.F.R. S 5.ioo(a)(ii) (1949).
210 4 DEP'T STATE BULL. 702, 748 (1941).
1 1 TDep't of State Press Release No. x8z, March io, 1952.
2 1 7 d. No. i, January 3, 1955.
'D Ibid.
..0 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § rot, 66 STAT. 166, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(15) (A) (ii)(952).
""Id. § 221, 66 STAT. x91, 8 U.S.C. §§ I2O1, x20(b) (1952).
.2. This waiver was by amendment of 22 C.F.R. S 41 (1958). See 22 FE. REG. 8119 (1957).
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E. Use of Foreign Trade to Achieve Political Objectives
The United States consciously seeks to adapt its foreign trade to its over-all
foreign policy. It is handicapped in this, however, by the fact that the Government
has at its disposal very few means by which it can directly allocate foreign trade.
It can sell agricultural surpluses, purchased from farmers under price-support legisla-
tion, to countries whose foreign policy it is seeking to influence. It can extend
technical assistance by sending specialists and setting up capital development projects.
Such direct positive governmental assistance forms a relatively small part of our
total aid. The chief means by which the United States can extend foreign economic
aid is by government grants and by credits to foreign governments to finance Ameri-
can exports. For the past decade, Congress has voted several billion dollars each year
for such aid. Most of this money has been spent to improve the military and eco-
nomic condition of West European allies. Some aid, however, has gone to com-
munist countries. Thus, in 1948 and thereafter, the United States gave credits to
Yugoslavia which enabled that country to obtain vitally needed commodities which
she had hitherto received from other communist countries; and in 1957 and 1958,
credits were extended to Poland to enable that country to purchase surplus farm
goods and mining machinery. 23
123 The first agreement between the United States and Communist Poland, concluded on June 7,
1957, provided for the sale and shipment of $S8,goo,ooo of surplus agricultural commodities, with
payment in Polish zlotys, pursuant to tit. I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954, as amended. The zlotys were to be deposited to the account of the United States, and on the
same date of such deposit, were to be converted and transferred to a special dollar denominated account
to the credit of the United States in the National Bank of Poland. Poland agreed to purchase for dollars
the balance of zloiys unexpended in x962, to the extent of $726,000 annually. Surplus Agricultural
Commodities Agreement With the Polish People's Republic, June 7, 1957, [1957] 8 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 799,
T.I.A.S. No. 3839 (effective June 7, 1957).
In addition, the United States loaned Poland $30,000,000, administered through the Export-Import
Bank, for the purchase of surplus products and mining machinery. This line of credit is repayable at
4'z% interest in dollars over a 2o-year period, beginning in x962. N.Y. Times, June 8, 1957, p. r, col. 5.
On Aug. 14, 1957, the June 7 th agreement was supplemented by the additional financing by the
United States of wheat and cotton sales totaling $46,ioo.ooo, in return for zlotys under the same arrange-
ment. Agreement Amending the Surplus Agricultural Commodities Agreement With the Polish People's
Republic of June 7, 1957, [1957] 8 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1289, T.I.A.S. No. 3878 (effective Aug. 14, 1957).
On Feb. 15, 1958, a second surplus agricultural commodities agreement was entered into, with the
United States undertaking the financing of the sale of $73,000,000 of commodities and transportation, with
payment in zlotys under arrangements similar to those of the June 7, 1957 agreement. Poland agreed
to buy back for dollars unexpended zlotys at the annual rate of $2,8so,ooo, beginning in 1963.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities Agreement with Poland, Feb. 1S, 1958, T.I.A.S. No. 3991 (effective
Feb. 15, x958). At the same time, a second loan of $25,000,000 was extended to Poland for the
purchase of raw materials and machinery for consumer goods industries. The loan, like the one in
1957, will come from the President's special assistance fund and will be administered by the Export-
Import Bank. N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, i958, p. i, col. 8.
Also, Poland has now been placed in a separate category from other East European countries for
export control purposes. An official of the United States Department of Commerce has stated: "Except
for a list of approximately 50 commodities, and except for unpublished technical data, exports to
Poland are subject to no more restriction than, say, to England or Italy. A considerable sum of money
has been loaned to Poland by the United States, and considerable quantities of modern equipment have
been approved against these credits for export under approved government programs to further the
industrial development of Poland, and to increase the economic well-being of her people." Address by
Frank W. Shaeffer, supra note 92.
In addition to 63 items on the so-called "Polish exceptions list," 15 C.F.R. § 371.52 (x957) (to which
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CONCLUSIONS
It is apparent from the foregoing analysis that the existing legal framework is
hardly adequate to support normal trade relations between the Soviet Union and the
United States. The legal obstacles to trade-on both sides-are due in part to the
strained political relations between the two countries, and in part to differences in
their respective systems of trading.
On the Soviet side, we have seen that despite important adaptations of the
system of foreign trade to the requirements of the international commercial and
legal order, there is need for still further adjustment:
i. Problems created by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, though substantially
reduced by the establishment of legally responsible foreign trade combines, are not
entirely eliminated.
2. Although the combines have accepted the basic concepts and institutions of
commercial law and custom common to the international trading community, the
foreign trader who deals with them must still contend with certain features of Soviet
law arising from the fact that their representatives are state officials subordinate ad-
ministratively to the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
3. Despite the apparent fairness of reported decisions of the Soviet Foreign
Trade Arbitration Tribunal, and assuming its impartiality in fact, there remains an
open question of its legal capacity for impartiality or, to put it more precisely, the
potentiality of abuse of its independence.
4. The insulation of the ultimate consuming or producing enterprise from the
foreign exporter or importer, although occasionally overcome in practice, is fostered
by the monopolization of foreign trade transactions by a relatively small number of
central agencies which are essentially brokers.
5. The secrecy of Soviet authorities concerning the details of foreign trade
planning and concerning Soviet market conditions, though somewhat relaxed in re-
cent years, is a substantial obstacle to normal trade relations.
6. Similarly, the virtual impossibility for foreigners to establish branch offices,
licensing arrangements, and other means of maintaining close and enduring contacts
with Soviet industry is a substantial obstacle to normal trade relations.
Every one of these obstacles could be reduced, and some of them could be re-
moved entirely, without making any fundamental change in the Soviet system of
trading:
85 commodities were added and from which 30 were subtracted in January, x959, as a consequence of
the removal of some 300 commodity entries from the Positive List in November 1958, Bureau of Foreign
Commerce, Current Export Bulletin No. 81o, Jan. 8, 1959), and to unpublished (or not generally avail-
able in published form) technical data, id. § 385.2, to which Mr. Shaeffer referred, Poland is also
subject to restrictions on ship stores, plane stores, and crew and registered carrier stores, id. §§ 371.13
and 372.7, and on shipments of limited value. Id. § 371.10; cf. also id. § 371.9.
Poland has been removed from the list of countries to which the Treasury prohibits the sending
of government checks. Supra note sio.
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i. By treaty, the Soviet Union could waive all claims of sovereign immunity by
its trading organizations' 2 4
2. In some instances by legislation and in others by contract, various features
of Soviet law which are inappropriate for international trade could be eliminated."
3. Settlement of disputes could be handled by a special arbitration board con-
sisting of American, Soviet, and third-country members;'26 at the very least, the
panel of the Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission should contain a sub-
stantial number of Westerners who would be known and respected by Western
businessmen.
4. The decentralization of Soviet industry and construction which is now taking
place could be extended to Soviet foreign trade, and some state industrial enterprises,
at least, could be given direct access to foreign markets. 2
7
5. A great deal more information could be made available to foreigners regard-
ing both the. details of the planning system and the details of the plans themselves.
6. Branch offices and licensing arr.angements could be permitted to foreign
firms, and some protection, at least for foreign patents could be assured.1
28
All of these steps would contribute to the creation of a climate favorable to ex-
panded commercial relations, without altering the basic characteristics of the Soviet
system of foreign trade.
On the Am erican side, the time has come to weigh the utility of each of our
various types of restrictions from both a military and an economic viewpoint, and
to attempt to establish a system of controls which will make sense from both view-
points. On. the import side, virtually all special restrictions directed against com-
munist countries could be removed without any adverse effect upon our military
or economic welfare. If there was any military or economic justification for such
restrictions in the past, based upon the existence of a dollar shortage in other
countries, such justification no longer exists: the communist countries can sell their
furs, oil, chrome, chemicals, cameras, etc., elsewhere than in the United States with
more or less equal advantage to themselves and with adverse effect upon us to the
extent that we wish to purchase such goods. An exception to this is manganese
and other strategic goods for whose supply we should not become dependent upon
124 Cf. discussion supra 484-85, 486, 490.
12 Cf. discussion supra 490-92.
C f. discussion supra 485, 493-95. The establishment of a joint Soviet-American arbitration commis-
sion was proposed to the Soviet. Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission by the American Arbitration
Association in 1946. American Arbitration Association Press Release, May 1, 1946.
12" Cf. discussion supra 497-99. The decentralization of industry has consisted chiefly in the estab-
lishment of over zoo economic regions in the Soviet Union, with the transfer of administration of many
industries from central ministries in Moscow, many of which have been dissolved, to regional economic
councils. Central control is maintained through representation of the regional economic councils on
the councils of ministers of the 16 republics and through representation of the republican councils of
ministers on the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union. There has been no talk of decentralization
of foreign trade in the Soviet Union (though there has been such talk, and some steps in that direction,
in Poland), beyond informal reports that some regional economic councils have the right to resist Min-
istry of Foreign Trade orders.
1,' Cf. supra note 53.
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the communist countries; the import of such goods should be limited, however, by
quotas rather than by customs duties, since thereby we would be in a position to
import them in small enough quantities to do us no harm and some good. The
principal changes required to assure equality of treatment would be the elimination
by Congress of tariff discrimination against products imported from communist coun-
tries and of the prohibition against the importation of certain kinds of furs and
skins.120
With respect to exchange controls, the administrative restriction upon the sending
of Treasury checks to East European countries (other than Yugoslavia and Polandj
affects chiefly persons entitled to American veterans' benefits, United States' Gov-
ernment pensions, and the like, and hence the elimination of this restriction would
not affect trade directly; it would, however, help to create a more favorable political '
climate for trade.
As for American exports to communist countries, our Positive List could be
brought into harmony with that of Canada and, of the West European countries,
and general license privileges could be granted foi all goods not on the Posi ive List,
without, it would seem, jeopardizing our security. Not much is gained from a
security standpoint by preventing the Soviets from buying here what the, can y
from our Canadian or West European competitors. 3  To eliminat& the ,Positie
List altogether, however, as the Soviet leaders-wish us to do, would involve':th'e
danger that private exporters co'uld sell to the Soviet Union or other communist
countries goods of military importance. .. . ",
The Soviet Government does not need to use the device of a Positive List; "for it
directly controls all Soviet exports and imports. -It is, therefore, not .bound- by. con-
ceptual distinctions between strategic and. nonstrategic items. It can export strategic
goods when it is strategic to do so, and can import nonstrategic goods when it. is
strategic to do so. The United States Government exercises, for the most part,, only
indirect, or secondary, controls on exports; it either grants or denies license applica-
tions of private exporters.. Its general standard for granting.,or denying such applicg-
tions is the broad one of "national security interesis," and to make this, standard
meaningful, it declares in advance that certain exports are "peaceful" and others'are
"strategic" and the rest are in between. But however conscientiously such a, classifica,
tion of exports may be made and administered, '"ft is bound to be unsatisfactory.
Aluminum was until the end of 1958 on the Positive List, but in 1958, the Soviet
Union exported aluminum in large quantities and at low prices.. Benzene, although
120 C. discussion supra 505-09. The present laws on dumping, on countervailing duties, on equalihi-
tion of costs of production, on retaliation against discrimination, on private loans to foreign governments,
and on governmental purchases are not directed solely, or even principally, against the Soviet Union or
other communist countries, so that their existence cannot be considered as in itself discriminatory. Whether
they make sense is another question. Treasury licensing of imports of specific goods from communist
countries is designed to prevent the transshipment of those goods from Communist China;g as indi-
cated supra note io2, our policy regarding trade with Communist China and North Korea is regarded
as distinct from our policy regarding trade with other communist countries.
"0 Cf. N.Y. Times, March 14, 1958, p. 36, col. 8; id., July 53, § 3, P. I, col. 2; id., Aug. :u, 1958,
p. 2, col. 4; id., Sept. 27, p. 27, col. 3-
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not on the Positive List, is also not on the GLSA list and hence requires a validated
license for export to the Soviet Union, but that country recently contracted to sell
Dow Chemical Company benzene to the value of some $13,ooo,ooo.1 a1
Above all, the concept of a Positive List of strategic exports as the major device
for governmental control of trade with the Soviet Union fails to meet the problem
of reciprocity, in the sense of mutual advantage to the two countries. An American
trader who buys Soviet furs, for example, is rarely in a position to ask the Soviet
Government, "Why won't you buy American cosmetics?" The American trader
is properly concerned only with his own business! 2 Soviet buyers and sellers, on
the other hand, operate under a foreign trade plan which is designed to serve the
national interests of the Soviet Union. To the extent, then, that the Soviet Union
trades with American firms, jt is planning American foreign trade. Our export
licensing system sets limits to our trade with the Soviet Union, but it does not exert
a positive influence on that trade; it affects only remotely what the Soviets sell to us,
and only indirectly what they, in fact, buy from us.
The United States Government could protect our national interests, and at the
same time promote American-Soyiet trade, by entering into a bilateral trade agree-
ment with the Soviet Government authorizing the exchange of particular goods in
particular quantities over a parficular period of time. Whether such an agreement
provided for a relatively smal or a relatively large volume of trade, it would have
advantages for both sides. From the Soviet viewpoint, it would eliminate difficulties
created by the complexity of our export-licensing system, since the United States
Government would promise in advance to issue licenses within the limits of the
trade agreement; and it would ,pable the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade more
effectively to gear its trade with the United States into the Soviet planning system.
From the American viewpoint, 'it would ensure that our trade with the Soviet Union
is to the advantage of the natioq as a whole, and not merely of those particular
exporters or importers who are now able to get through the meshes of both Soviet
and American controls.
By a trade agreement of the kind suggested, the American national interest could
be promoted in the following ways:
i. Our Government could assure the supply into this country of some Soviet
112 Cf. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1958, p. 3, col. 5. Benzene was also imported from the Soviet Union
in relatively large quantities in x956 ($10,532,oo) and 1957 ($6,299,000). U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Export Control, 3 d quarter 1958, p. 34-
129 Occasionally, such a private arransgement is worked out. Thus, it was announced recently that a
New York export-import concern had arranged for the sale to the Soviet Union of 20,000 tons of cold-
rolled steel sheets and the simultaneous purchase from the Soviet Union of 8o,ooo tons of high-grade
metallurgical chrome ore used in making stainless and other specialty steels and high-temperature alloys.
The New York broker stated that the transaction "technically was not a barter arrangement," since he
paid for the ore and the Soviets paid for the steel, both sales.being at "going world prices," but that the
cost of the ore was about that of the steel. N.Y. Times, Jan.,9, 1959, p. 35c, col. 4. One may surmise
that it was easier for the broker to obtain the ,United States export license for the steel in view of the
concurrent import of the chrome.
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products which our importers want but which are not now available because the
Soviets are selling them under trade agreements with other countries.
2. It could assure the purchase by the Soviets of some products they now procure
from our exporters' competitors in other countries.
3. It could prevent purchase by the Soviets of very small quantities of machinery
bought merely as models to be copied-a practice of which we often complain.
4. The extra bargaining power which the Soviet combines derive from their
monopolistic character could be partially offset.
5. An even more efficient protection would be provided against export of strategic
goods than is possible under our present system of controls, since our Government
could determine in advance which products desired by the Soviets it would be
willing to license.
6. Some of the obstacles to normal trade relations created by the Soviet system,
listed above, could be reduced.
In solving some of the old problems, such a trade agreement would also create
new ones. The most our Government would or should be willing to do is to
agree to issue export licenses to private traders for the products listed in the agree-
ment and-Congress willing-to remove discriminations against Soviet imports 1 3
Whether the Soviet Government would be willing to make firmer commitments,
in view of its administrative control over its export-import combines, would be a
matter for negotiation. In any case, problems of fulfillment of the agreement would
inevitably arise. It would remain for our private traders to make contracts with
the Soviet export-import combines, in which matters of price, quantity, quality,
time and method of delivery, and other conditions of particular transactions would
have to be worked out. It would be necessary to devise proper techniques for coun-
teracting any delinquency in the execution of contracts and to ensure that the
deliveries ultimately corresponded as nearly as possible with the terms of the agree-
ment.
In June 1958, Soviet Premier Khrushchev proposed such a Soviet-American trade
agreement in a letter to President Eisenhower'3 4 The letter listed types of industrial
products of a peaceful nature which the Soviet Union would like to purchase in
the United States, and types of products which the Soviet Union would offer to sell
""
3 According to one view, a most-favored-nation clause in treaties between planned and free-market
economies benefits only the planned economies, which may continue to discriminate administratively
against imports from a country while granting tariff equality. See Domke & Hazard, State Trading
and the Most-Favored-Nation Clause, 52 Am. J. INT'L L. 55 (1958). It is submitted that the authors
have taken too narrow a view of the function of the most-favored-nation clause. Historically, it is true,
its primary function has been to assure equality of treatment with respect to customs duties, and this
remains its primary function for a country like the United States, in which the tariff is the primary means
of import control. The principle of nondiscrimination, however, which underlies the most-favored-nation
clause, may easily be extended to controls other than tariffs. In trade agreements between planned and
free economies, the most-favored-nation clause should be particularized; that is, reciprocity should he
secured by particular nondiscrimination clauses relating to such matters as granting of visas, access to
courts, access to markets, use of shipping, and the like, as well as to customs duties.
IS& 39 DEP'T STATE BULL. 200 (1958).
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in the United States."3 5 It also proposed that American specialists be sent to the
Soviet Union and that 'licensing agreements could be made in individual cases.
It suggested'that a very large expansion of Soviet-American trade would raise ques-
tions concerning the possibility of long-term credits, but added that "of course, it is
possible to begin the development of commerce on the basis of reciprocal deliveries."
The letter also stated: "It is also obvious that the development of trade between
the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. will require the creation of the requisite contractual and
legal basis. The question of creating such a basis, as well as that of implementing
a program for purchases of American goods and deliveries of Soviet goods, and also
payments for them, could, provided the Government of the U.S.A. consents, be sub-
ject to intergovernmental negotiation."
President Eisenhower's reply stated that "the United States favors the expansion
of peaceful trade with the Soviet Union," but it rejected the bid for an intergovern-
mental agreement. "As you know," the President wrote,13 1
United States export and import trade is carried on by individual firms and not under
governmefital auspices. There is no need, therefore, to formalize relations between United
States firms and Soviet trade organizations. Soviet trade organizations are free right now,
without any need for-special action by the United States Government, to develop~a larger
volume of trade with firms in this country. .. . Furthermore, many of the more im-
portant Soviet trade items mentioned in your letter are accorded duty-free entry into
the United States. While the extension of long-term credits for Soviet purchases in the
United States would raise complex legal and political questions, the normal commercial
credit terms presently available to Soviet trade organizations permit the further expansion
of trade between our two countries.
The President added: "I am asking the Department of State to examine the spe-
cific proposals contained in your letter and to communicate further with your govern-
ment." To date, there has been no announcement of a further communication by
the Department of State.
While it is undoubtedly true that Soviet-American trade could be expanded with-
out any changes in existing American governmental or legal policies or practices, it
2 . The proposal stated that it was directed not to trade in armaments or plant equipment for military
production, but to industrial equipment for production of consumer goods and to nonmilitary industrial
products and finished goods, including the following types: refrigeration equipment; installations for
air conditioning; equipment for the cellulose, paper and wood-processing industries, textile, leather-
footwear, and food industries; television equipment; equipment for manufacture of packing materials;
packing, packaging, and automatic-vending machines; pumps and compressors; machinery for the
mining industry, for the manufacture of building materials, and the mechanization of construction;
hoisting, transporting, and other equipment; equipment for rolling ferrous metals; pipes for city gas
lines; and various chemical products, medical equipment, medicines, and certain consumer goods.
Soviet products which the proposal stated might be exported to the United States included "manganese
and chromium ores, cellulose and paper products, ferrous alloys, platinum, palladium, asbestos, potassium
salts, lumber, certain chemical products, 'furs, and other goods," as well as "a number of types of
modern machinery and equipment which could be of interest to American firms." Also the proposal
stated that "If American firms manifest an interest, the Soviet Union could also consider the question
of developing the extraction of iron ore for delivery to the U. S. A." Ibid.
... Ibid. The legal difficulties apparently consist in the provisions of the Johnson Act. Cl. supra
516-17 and notes 103-07.
SoviET-AmERiCAN TRADE
is also true that American restrictions place severe obstacles in the path of such an
expansion. The products which Khrushchev proposed to buy from American firms
are, for the most part, neither on the Positive List of strategic exports nor on the
GLSA list of "peaceful" goods subject to general license for the Soviet area. They
require, therefore, a validated license, and there can be no advance assurance that
such licenses will be granted. Since they are, for the most part, industrial plant
and equipment, it would be necessary for American manufacture exporters to con-
duct elaborate preparations in order to make bids; few firms would be willing to
undertake the expense of making such bids without advance assurance that export
licenses would be granted. Similarly, with respect to Soviet exports to the United
States, although it is true, as the President stated, that some of the products listed
by Khrushchev are duty-free, others are subject to a tariff rate higher than that which
is applied to the same products imported from other countries; and even those
which are duty-free may fall within the various restrictions which have been men-
tioned.'37
The peculiar problems of creating a proper legal framework for trade between
the Soviet Union and the United States have a general significance, for they demon-
strate that the principles of free multilateral trade and the policy of seeking to reduce
quantitative restrictions and discriminatory practices in international trade, though
valid for trade among market economies, are inappropriate to commercial relations
between communist and noncommunist countries. The principles and policies of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, designed as a framework for trade
relations among countries whose trade is carried on primarily by private traders, do
not meet the problems of trade relations between such countries and other countries.
whose commerce is itself a governmental function. Indeed, the United States ha&
by its existing restrictions abandoned both the principle and the policy of free trade
with communist countries' 38
Because we cannot cope with the hard fact of the appearance of the Soviet state
monopoly on world markets without some form of governmental control does not
mean, however, that we must develop a "Government overseas trade monopoly to
compete with the Soviet monopoly on equal terms," as some have proposed. 39 This.
would be to jump from the frying pan into the fire. The better alternative is to try-
to turn down the heat. The Government should try to help businessmen, both in
dealing with the Soviets and in competing with them; it can do so without going-
into business itself.
An intergovernmental trade agreement providing for a program of mutual ex-
changes of particular goods over a particular period would require the creation of a_
13 Supra 505-10.
.. This was expressly recognized by the dissolution of GATT commitments between the United!
States and Czechoslovakia. 2 GATT, BAsIc INsTRUMENTs AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 36 (1952).
... Such a proposal is reported by James Reston to have been made by "a high official of the United
States Government," who said that it had been under discussion "quietly inside our own Government for-
six months . . . but this is so foreign to our normal way of doing business that we dare not mentio&
it in public." N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1958, p. 17, col. 3.
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system of cooperation between our Government and our individual business firms
which would go far beyond the existing system of governmental controls upon
private trade with communist countries, without, however, replacing private trade
with state trading. It would involve, therefore, a readjustment of existing concepts
of the relationship between business and government in the field of international
trade; more specifically, it would involve the supplementing of the concept of gov-
ernment control of business by the concept of active cooperation between govern-
ment and business in this field. Such a readjustment is required if we are to trade
on competitive terms with countries which treat foreign trade as a governmental
function.
